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Abstract 
This white paper represents a summary of work intended to lay the foundation for 
development of a climatologicaVagent model of climate-induced conflict. The paper 
combines several loosely-coupled efforts and is the final report for a four-month late-start 
Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) project funded by the 
Advanced Concepts Group (ACG). The project involved contributions by many 
participants having diverse areas of expertise, with the common goal of learning how to 
tie together the physical and human causes and consequences of climate change. We 
performed a review of relevant literature on conflict arising from environmental scarcity. 
Rather than simply reviewing the previous work, we actively collected data from the 
referenced sources, reproduced some of the work, and explored alternative models. We 
used the unfolding crisis in Darfur (western Sudan) as a case study of conflict related to 
or triggered by climate change, and as an exercise for developing a preliminary concept 
map. We also outlined a plan for implementing agents in a climate model and defined a 
logical progression toward the ultimate goal of running both types of models 
simultaneously in a two-way feedback mode, where the behavior of agents influences the 
climate and climate change affects the agents. Finally, we offer some “lessons learned” in 
attempting to keep a diverse and geographically dispersed group working together by 
using Web-based collaborative tools. 
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Climate Change Effects on International 
Stability: A White Paper 
1 Introduction 
The security of the United States is increasingly vulnerable to challenges by a new 
threat. Changes in the global climate, caused by a combination of natural and human- 
induced influences, are already occurring. The paleoclimate record suggests that very 
abrupt climate changes are possible. As the world’s climate changes, human societies will 
respond by adaptive behaviors that could lead to changing global alliances, civil unrest, 
and war as populations shift and vie for territory and natural resources. 
Strong and accelerating global trends are reducing the availability of vital resources 
such as water, food, soil, territory, and stable climate, potentially heightening tensions 
between or within nations. Foreign policy experts have compiled evidence that such 
scarcities can precipitate conflict. As Homer-Dixon (1 993) writes, “. . . researchers have 
gathered enough information to reach a disturbing conclusion: environmental scarcities 
are already contributing to violent conflicts in many parts of the developing world. 
Moreover, these conflicts may be the early signs of an upsurge in violence in the coming 
decades-especially in poor countries-that is caused or aggravated by environmental 
change.” 
The ability of policy makers to anticipate and help to mitigate the potential conflicts 
in society that are caused by changes in global climate requires a better understanding of 
the interaction between social and physical Earth systems. To further this understanding, 
we are developing methods to incorporate historical climatology into an established 
macrostructural analysis as a necessary first step toward developing a coupled 
climatologicaVagent forecast model of climate-induced conflict. In the initial phase of 
this project, which was funded by Sandia National Laboratories’ (Sandia’s) Advanced 
Concepts Group (ACG) under the Laboratory Directed Research and Development 
(LDRD) Program, we worked toward developing a proof-of-principle methodology with 
the goal of laying the groundwork for coupling agent-based social models to physics- 
based climate models. 
1 .I Background 
Although there have been a number of efforts within the defense and intelligence 
communities to develop models capable of forecasting areas of potential conflict on time 
scales of 10 to 20 years, notably missing from these models is an explicit dependence on 
weather and climate. The Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, led by Andrew Marshall, 
recently acknowledged this deficiency (Schwartz and Randall 2003) and has issued a 
series of recommendations for accelerating research on the connection between climate 
change and conflict. 
Much of the research work that has been done in analyzing conflict and 
environmental change follows a qualitative approach. For example, Homer Dixon (1 993) 
has written extensively about the relationships among environmental degradation, 
resource scarcity, and conflict. Similarly, the Global Business Network recently used 
scenario analysis (Schwartz and Randall 2003) to hypothesize social responses to various 
scenarios of abrupt climate change. In 2003, Sandia’s ACG sponsored a workshop on 
global climate change and international security (Karas 2003) in which a panel of experts 
developed three scenarios to illustrate the types of conflicts that could be precipitated by 
changes in the global climate. These scenarios included escalating conflicts between 
destabilized nuclear powers, the loss of nuclear weapons from the arsenal of a 
destabilized country, and the decision of an impacted nonnuclear nation to develop a 
nuclear deterrence. 
1.2 Technical Approach 
To address the limitations of current conflict-forecasting models described above, 
Sandia pursued a multipronged approach to analyze the relationships between climate 
and conflict. This approach involved the following activities: 
We monitored several emerging conflicts in the world, including Bangladesh and 
the Sudanese region of Darfur. We selected the Darfur conflict as a candidate case 
study for further analysis. 
We quantitatively explored causal factors related to the study of state conflict 
using the Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence (FASE) method, which was 
developed by the Center for Army Analysis (Chen 2000). We also applied 
traditional statistical regression methods. The FASE pattern-classification 
algorithm has already provided conditional probabilities of conflict based on 
historical data for such independent variables as youth bulge, infant mortality rate, 
and trade openness (O’Brien 2002). We extended O’Brien’s data set to 
incorporate the occurrence of natural disasters. 
We reviewed and tested other statistical methods from the behavioral and social 
sciences to further probe the causal relationships between climate and conflict. 
These methods are qualitative choice theory (QCT), cointegration, Granger 
causality, and Bayesian causal discovery (BCD). 
We identified the process that would be required to couple an agent-based model 
with a climate model. 
In addition, to implement this approach across our multidisciplinary team, we took 
advantage of an internal Web collaborative environment, the Wiki, through which we 
could post and share the results of our work and exchange information and ideas in a 
timely fashion. 
1.3 Document Overview 
This white paper is organized as a set of individually referenced topical sections, 
closely tracking our technical approach. Section 1 has introduced the need for including 
the variable of climate as part of forecasting conflict and has outlined our preliminary 
technical approach to addressing this need. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the 
Darfur crisis and includes a preliminary visual model that identifies interacting factors 
and conditions that we believe contribute to that conflict. In Section 3, we briefly 
introduce the field of conflict forecasting and then describe the analyses of conflict 
performed with the FASE algorithm and with traditional statistical regression models, 
including interpretation of the results of these analyses. Section 4 contains an overview of 
selected statistical approaches from the behavioral and social sciences and provides 
examples of how these approaches could be applied in conflict analyses. Section 5 
proposes a process by which we can couple well-established climate models with agent- 
based models. For those unfamiliar with collaborative platforms, Section 6 highlights key 
features of the Wiki and reports on our experience with it. A summary of key findings 
and lessons learned from all of the project’s activities is provided in Section 7. The report 
concludes with Section 8, where we discuss future development of a coupled 
climate/agent-based model and possible applications for its use in related and different 
fields. 
1.4 References 
Chen, Y.Y. 2000. “Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence.” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy 
Systems 8, no. 6: 79699. 
Homer-Dixon, T. 1993. Environmental Scarcity and Global Security (Headline Series no. 
300). New York: Foreign Policy Association. 
Karas, T. H. 2003. Global Climate Change and International Security. SAND2003-4 1 14. 
Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories. 
O’Brien, S. P. 2002. “Anticipating the Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: an Early Warning 
Approach to Conflict and Instability Analysis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 
6: 791-811. 
Schwartz, P., and D. Randall. 2003. An Abrupt Climate Change Scenario and Its 
Implications for United States National Security. Available at 
http://www.ems. org/climate/pentagon climate change .html#report (accessed 3 0 
October 2004). 
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2 Examining Darfur: A Candidate Case Study of 
Conflict Related to Climate Change 
As part of this LDRD project, we began investigating a world conflict that involves 
changes in climate. We chose the Sudanese region of Darfur as a candidate case study for 
two reasons. First, the conflict is occurring now. Thus, there is a great deal of information 
about it in the media, including news, opinion, and propaganda. Second, we believe that 
this conflict demonstrates the connection between climate-change-induced environmental 
scarcity and conflict. It is a connection that is not simple, but is rather one that has many 
contributing factors that are exacerbated by the changes in climate. 
For several months we used Google News to monitor the conflict and posted this 
information on our internal Web site (see Section 6) .  As we learned about the complex 
interacting factors and conditions, we also developed a relational diagram of the conflict, 
using tools from systems dynamics. In this section, we provide a general description of 
the crisis in Darfur and show our initial attempt to pictorially represent this conflict. 
Importantly, the work described in this section constitutes a framework for developing 
case studies of responses to climate change and environmental scarcity in follow-on work 
for this project. 
Because the crisis is ongoing and taking place in a remote part of the world, accurate 
and up-to-date information is not available from peer-reviewed sources. Consequently, 
we relied heavily on Web-based international media for information. The references in 
Section 2.3 reflect the transient nature of the information associated with this report, 
which is intended as a guide to future work but not as defmitive research. 
2.1 General Description 
2.1 .I About Darfur 
Sudan. To the west, as shown in Figure 2- 1 ,  
Darfur borders Libya, Chad, and the Central 
African Republic (HRW 2004). Darfur is 
approximately 80% the size of Texas (U.S. Senate 
2004) and covers 150,000 square miles (Ryle 
2004). The population of Darfur is estimated at 
around 6 million (US. Senate 2004). 
Darfur is located in the northwestern part of 
Geographically, Darfur extends from desert 
in the north to a central area, which includes the 
Jebel Marra volcanic plateau, to savannah in the 
south (Vemey 2004). The central area has more 
rainfall and more fertile soil than the other areas 
and is thus the richest agriculturally (HRW 2004; 
Verney 2004). 
Figure 2-1. Map of Sudan. Source: 
University of Texas Libraries. Perry- 
Castaneda Library Map Collection. 
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2.1.2 The Current Crisis 
The United Nations (UN) has called the current crisis in Darfur the worst 
humanitarian disaster in the world today (CSM 2004). The crisis erupted in February 
2003 when two loosely allied rebel groups, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the 
Justice Equality Movement (JEM), launched attacks on government posts in Darfur. The 
rebels had a few victories in the initial months of the conflict, but then the government 
“turned loose” the Janjaweed militias, backed by its regular forces, on civilians who were 
thought to support the insurgency (ICG 2004). The Janjaweed militias are made up of 
Arab nomadic shepherds and have been described as a civilian terrorist force (Age 2004). 
The Janjaweed have been accused of major human rights violations, mass killings of 
civilians, rape and other forms of sexual violence, forced displacement, and burning of 
villages (Reeves 2004a; HRF 2004a). The Janjaweed have also been accused of 
intentionally destroying irrigation systems and food stores so that the civilian populations 
do not return to the burned-out villages (ICG 2004). 
In April 2004, a cease fire that was mediated by Chad was signed by the Sudan 
government and the two rebel groups, with help fiom the African Union (AU), the UN, 
and several Western states (ICG 2004). However, as of July 2004, serious fighting 
continued despite the ceasefire (Washington Times 2004). 
The crisis has taken a huge toll on the civilian population of Darfur. The number of 
persons displaced by the conflict has been estimated at approximately 1.45 million within 
Darfur (HRF 2004a); most are in refugee camps within Darfur (ICG 2004), with 
approximately 200,000 in camps in Chad (HRF 2004a). The statistic on the number of 
deaths, however, appears to be questionable. In early October 2004, the British 
Broadcasting Company (BBC 2004a) reported that an estimated 50,000 people had died 
as a result of the conflict since it began in 2003. By late October, the BBC reported that 
the number of deaths had risen to 70,000 (BBC 2004b). However, according to Professor 
Eric Reeves (2004b) of Smith College, the “50,000” figure refers to the number of people 
who have died from disease in the refugee camps since April 2004, as reported by the 
World Health Organization (WHO). Reeves estimates that as many as 300,000 people 
have died fiom violence, disease, and malnutrition since February 2003 when the Darfur 
crisis erupted. 
During late October 2004, peace talks between the Sudanese government and the 
rebels resumed in Nigeria (Cape Times 2004), but these talks were subsequently stalled 
because of concerns by the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) about security (BBC 
2004b). Note that the SLM is another name for the SLA (Sudan Liberation Army). 
2.1.3 Origins of the Current Crisis 
The International Crisis Group (ICG 2004) states that there were multiple causes for 
the insurgency in Darfur in 2003, including economic and political marginalization, 
underdevelopment, and the government’s policy (longstanding) of supporting the 
Janjaweed militias against the primarily African farming communities. According to 
several sources, the roots of the current violence can be traced to traditional clashes 
13 
between nomadic (pastoral) Arab herders and sedentary African farmers (HRW 2004; 
U.S. Senate 2004; Powell 2004). Such clashes occurred as Arab herders from the north 
migrated south in the dry season in search of water sources and grazing for their cattle 
(HRW 2004; Verney 2004) and the cattle and camels of the herders trampled the fields of 
the African farmers (HRW 2004). Some sources say the conflicts in Darfur have been 
going on for several decades, while others say centuries (HRW 2004; Verney 2004; El- 
Leithy 2004). Traditionally, such conflicts were resolved by negotiation, but the conflicts 
intensified during the 1980s and 1990s because of drought and also the government’s 
policy of arming the Arab herders and removing the weapons of the farmers (Verney 
2004). 
2.1.4 Structural Conditions 
The conflict is fueled by a number of interacting factors, including environmental, 
economic, social, and political factors, as highlighted below. International concerns and 
actions toward the D a r k  crisis are also briefly addressed. 
2.1.4.1 Environmental Factors 
pressure on those who live in the northern part of Darfur to move southward (Verney 
2004) and thus contributing to the historic struggle for land between the herders and the 
farmers (Mulugeta 2004). Desertification is defined as “land degradation in arid, semi- 
arid and dry subhumid areas resulting from various factors, including climatic variations 
and human activities” (McCarthy et al. 200 1). Examples of such human activities are 
overcultivation, deforestation, and poor irrigation practices, which reduce the amount of 
arable land (UNCCD 2004). 
Climate change since the 1970s has accelerated the pace of desertification, putting 
Though the rainy season came to Darfur in 2004, civilians have had to flee the land 
to escape the conflict and thus were unable to plant their crops, contributing to a shortage 
of food in the region. The rains also spur flash floods, which make the roads impassable, 
restrict the delivery of assistance, and increase the risk of disease (Berm 2004). In 
addition, there has been concern that locusts currently threatening northern Africa would 
swarm to Darfur, where locust-control efforts would be impossible (AAAS 2004; U.S. 
Senate 2004). Locusts eat their weight in food every day (AAAS 2004). 
2.1.4.2 Economic Factors 
tomatoes; the nomadic pastoralists raise camels in the north and cattle in the south. 
Livestock is Darfur’s main export (Verney 2004). 
The farmers in Darfur grow crops such as sorghum, millet, groundnuts, and 
The groups in the conflict have different styles of living, or ways of being in the 
world, i.e., nomadic versus sedentary, which directly relate to the competition between 
the pastoralists and the farmers for land and water as climate change affects the region. 
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2.1.4.3 Social Factors 
Arab or African ethnic groups, such as the Fur, Masaalit, Tunjur, Tama, Bergid, and 
Berti. The pastoralists, on the other hand, are predominantly of Arab descent. The 
herding tribes of the northern area include Arab ethnic groups such as the northern 
Rizeigat, Mahariya, and the African Zaghawa. Cattle-herding Arab tribes, such as the 
southern Rizeigat and Habbaniya, inhabit the southern area of Darfur (HRW 2004). In the 
current conflict, the Fur, Masaalit and Zaghawa African ethnic groups view the attacks on 
their communities as racially and ethnically motivated (BBC 2004a). 
Generally, the sedentary farmers of the central area of Darfur are composed of non- 
Regarding religious orientation, Darfur is uniformly a Muslim region (ICG 2004). 
Lord (2004), commenting on the contribution of social factors to the Darfur conflict, 
The root cause of the Darfur conflict is actually ecological, with prolonged droughts 
and rapid desertification dnving poor pastoral ‘Arabs’ to take over the lands of even 
poorer settled ‘black’ farmers. With extensive damage to the ecology throughout the 
region, what we see as ethnic conflict is really resource conflict at root, with religion 
even further down the list of factors. 
noted: 
2.1.4.4 Political Factors 
coup (ICG 2004). For its participation in the Darfur crisis, the government has been 
denounced by the international community (see Section 2.1.4.5). 
The present Arab Islamic government of Sudan came to power in 1989 in a military 
Sudan itself has had an ongoing civil war for 21 years between the government and 
southern rebels, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). In May 2004, a 
preliminary peace agreement was signed in Naivasha, Kenya (ICG 2004). 
2.1.4.5 International Response 
as noted by recent developments. In September 2004, U.S. Secretary of State Colin 
Powell concluded that genocide has been committed in Darfur (U.S. Senate 2004; HRF 
2004a). Also in September 2004, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution 
threatening oil sanctions against Sudan if the government did not rein in the militias (the 
Janjaweed) (BBC 2004a). In October 2004, the UN announced the establishment of a 
commission of inquiry to investigate violations of international humanitarian law and 
human rights law in Darfur and to determine whether laws of genocide have occurred 
(HRF 2004b). 
The crisis in Darfur has become a subject of international concern and involvement, 
A number of relief organizations have been working in Darfur. In July, the 
TransAfrica Forum (2004) published a list of these organizations: Catholic Relief 
Services, International Committee of the Red Cross, Inter Action, Medair, Medicines 
Sans FrontierslDoctors Without Borders, Relief Web, UN Children’s Fund, UN World 
Food Programme, U.S. Agency for International Development, and the WHO. 
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Financial support for diplomatic and humanitarian relief efforts has been provided in 
great part by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Community 
(Benn 2004). 
The AU has dispatched several hundred cease-fire monitors to Darfur and 
announced, in October 2004, that it will increase this force tenfold. As of the end of 
October 2004, only about one-half of the 2.25 million people in Darfur who need food 
assistance were being reached (PBS 2004). 
2.2 Systems Dynamics Modeling of the Conflict 
Systems dynamics modeling is an approach used to describe interrelated systems. 
The method provides a set of tools that enables practitioners to construct qualitative and 
quantitative diagrams about the behavior of the selected systems (CFSD 2003). 
During the course of this project, we began to develop a concept map for 
understanding the Darfur crisis. In this task, we combined several of the graphical 
components from the set of systems dynamics tools to show the interaction of important 
elements of the conflict. These elements were taken from our review of the current 
literature and international media sources on the current crisis, as summarized in Section 
2.1. Figure 2-2 illustrates a preliminary concept map that we developed to help us 
understand the Darfur crisis and its relationship to environmental change. 
A 
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Figure 2-2. Concept map of the Darfur conflict. 
In the above figure, we have used several symbols: 
- A box represents a quantitative element (i.e., factor or condition) that has a causal 
relationship with another element and that can increase or decrease over time. 
An arrow denotes that one element is affecting another element. The "+" and "-" 
symbols that are associated with an arrow indicate the effect of the influence of 
one element on the other element. 
- In general, a "+" means that both elements move in the same direction, Le., an 
increase in the fmt element is expected to cause an increase in the second 
element, or a decrease in the first element is expected to cause a decrease in 
the second element. 
- In general, a "-" means that both elements move in the opposite direction, i.e., 
an increase in the fmt element is expected to cause a decrease in the second 
element, or a decrease in the first element is expected to cause an increase in 
the second element. 
Taking a small piece of the map, we can explain how the elements interact and 
influence each other. In the upper left, we have the element of drought, which is related 
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to human land-use patterns as well as climate change. Drought affects the movement of 
refugees (the Fur farmers). There is a + symbol on the arrow connecting the drought to 
the movement of refugees. This indicates that as the drought increases, the movement of 
refugees is expected to increase (or conversely, if the drought decreases, the refugees will 
move less). The movement of refugees has a similar relationship to the expansion of 
agricultural activity and competition over arable and pastoral land. For example, as the 
movement of refugees increases, agricultural activity will increase as the refugees find 
new areas to farm and also there will be competition for these new areas to farm. 
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3 Causal Factors of Conflict 
c 
In this section, we explore the factors and data related to the study of state conflict as 
preparation for forthcoming efforts to apply new methods, such as agent-based 
simulation, in the design of new models of conflict. We revisit recent work by O’Brien 
(2002) in which he forecasts the likelihood of country instability. Our purpose is to 
identify measurable factors that are understood or believed to influence the likelihood of 
state conflict. This effort will help us in formulating new models of conflict, particularly 
in gaining understanding about how climatic changes might affect the social or political 
stability in different regions or countries. 
Rather than simply reviewing the work that has already been presented, critiqued, 
and expanded in our references, we have actively collected data from the referenced 
sources, reproduced some of the work, and explored alternative models. We produce and 
present our findings primarily to provide empirical descriptions of some of the factors 
and principles that relate to state conflict. We do not present our work as being complete 
or without error. We provide neither detailed literature reviews nor descriptions of data 
and empirical methods, but rather leave the reader to acquaint herself with such 
information from our references. 
We begin our exploration of the factors and data related to the study of state conflict 
with a brief overview in Section 3.1 of conflict forecasting. Section 3.2 discusses how the 
Conflict Simulation Model (KOSIMO) database is used in conflict analysis, explains how 
we applied the FASE (Fuzzy Analysis of Statistical Evidence) pattern classification 
algorithm to reproduce some of O’Brien’s results, and shows how we extended O’Brien’s 
analysis to incorporate the occurrences of natural disasters. Section 3.3 describes our use 
of traditional statistical methods to analyze O’Brien’s model of instability and provides 
an interpretation of the results. In Section 3.4, we depart from the KOSIMO database, 
which projects orthogonal forms of conflict into a single subjective index, and explore 
more precise and objective measures of conflict in relation to the independent variables. 
3.1 Overview of Conflict Forecasting 
3.1 .I Background 
In 1994, Vice President A1 Gore initiated the State Failure Task Force (SFTF) to 
identify “early warnings” of conflict. The SFTF primarily used methods such as logistic 
regression, neural networks, and genetic algorithms to identifl data patterns that might 
serve as early warnings.’ 
In response to the SFTF, King and Zeng (2001) offer corrections and extensions to 
the SFTF findings. A thorough discussion of the background, methods, and issues related 
to these efforts is documented by King and Zeng and by O’Brien (2002). 
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From O’Brien 2002. 
O’Brien (2002) extends this line of work primarily by introducing the use of FASE 
developed by Chen (1995, 2000). The FASE method is intended to classify states 
according to their likelihood of conflict. O’Brien introduces this method to overcome 
some of the problems that plague multinomial logistic regression, such as 
multicollinearity and incomplete records. 
All of the efforts above involve forecasting models, which use historical data to 
extrapolate the likelihood of state conflict under potential future conditions. Indeed, 
O’Brien validates his approach on the criteria of forecasting performance metrics. 
3.1.2 Forecasting and Causal Relationships 
this exercise is not intended to improve upon the existing forecasting methods, but rather 
to help us understand and explain causal relationships for incorporation into 
fundamentally new methodologies. Regardless of our intent, we explore forecasting 
models because there is a link between forecasting and causal structure. King and Zeng 
(200 1) provide an illuminating discussion of this link. 
Although we explore forecasting models throughout Section 3, we must clarifi that 
3.2 FASE Analysis of Instability 
O’Brien analyzes “instability,” which includes actual conflict as well as nonviolent 
crises and “war-in-sight.” He uses the analogy of forecasting the “oiliness of the oily 
rags,” whether or not a spark occurs to set them ablaze. That is, O’Brien seeks to forecast 
the instability of a country, regardless of whether an event pushes the country into 
conflict. He pursues this objective by introducing a dependent variable derived from the 
KOSIMO database. 
3.2.1 The KOSIMO Database 
The KOSIMO database (see Pfetsch and Rohloff 2000) is maintained by the 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research. It was constructed under the 
assumption that all violent conflicts evolve from nonviolent crises for the purpose of 
quantifying relative regional instabilities. The database allows O’Brien to project all 
forms of conflict, regardless of the nature of the dispute, into a single index of intensity. 
This is a broad-stroke approach, which categorizes the instability of various countries 
annually into one of four levels of conflict intensity: 
1. Latent conflict; completely nonviolent 
2. Crisis; mostly nonviolent 
3. Severe crisis; sporadic, irregular use of force, “war-in-sight” crisis 
4. War; systematic, collective use of force by regular troops 
The KOSIMO Manual provides the operational definition of conflict: which reveals 
the motivation for using this database to forecast “instability”: 
See http://www.hiik.de/en/manual.htm. 2 
The term ‘conflict’ is defined as the clashing of overlapping interests (positional 
differences) around national values and issues (independence, self-determination, 
borders and territory, access to or distribution of domestic or international power); the 
conflict has to be of some duration and magnitude of at least two parties (states, 
groups of states, organizations or organized groups) that are determined to pursue 
their interests and win their case. At least one party is the organized state. Possible 
instruments used in the course of a conflict are negotiations, authoritative decisions, 
threat, pressure, passive or active withdrawals, or the use of physical violence and 
war. 
Note: In contrast to a purely quantitative criterion, i.e., 1,000 battle deaths for a ‘war,’ 
KOSIMO uses a qualitative definition: ‘. . . some duration and magnitude’. This 
definition was chosen to allow for non-violent conflicts that have not (yet) led to 
battle deaths, but-in the eyes of the participants-have the potential to escalate into 
a violent conflict. Also, this definition excludes all non-national, constitutional, 
criminal and economic conflicts. The dividing line between a political conflict in the 
sense of our operational definition and any other conflict is drawn after the study of 
each individual conflict. (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research 
1998-99) 
To better understand the KOSIMO data, we consider the case of Afghanistan. 
KOSIMO identifies a basic (underlying) conflict in Afghanistan and separates the basic 
conflict in Afghanistan into five partial conflicts, as listed in Table 3- 1. 
Table 3-1. Partial Conflicts in Afghanistan 
Further inspection of the KOSIMO database (results not shown here) reveals that 
KOSIMO lists Afghanistan as being in a state of war (level 4) from 1979-99. However, 
the Correlates of War (COW) database, which identifies explicit and objectively defined 
occurrences of conflict, lists only the Mujahedin war from 1978-92 and classifies this 
conflict as a civil war for control of the central government. In the case of Afghanistan, 
KOSIMO identifies a state of instability from 1992-99, whereas COW does not identify 
measurable or well-defined occurrences of conflict during that time period. 
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3.2.2 Rep rod uction 
description of the data and sources (see Section 3.6. for Web address). We were able to 
identically reproduce O’Brien’s conditional-probability plots, as shown in Figure 3- 1. 
These are plots of the FASE conditional probability of conflict across the range of values 
for each of the independent variables. 
We obtained data used by O’Brien from the O’Brien Web Site, which includes a full 
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Figure 3-1. Conditional probabilities of conflict. 
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Figure 3-1. Conditional probabilities of conflict (Continued). 
26 
3.2.3 Natural Disasters 
In his discussion, O’Brien (2002) describes the independent variables as “oily rags” 
that require a spark to set the country ablaze. Our preliminary analysis was aimed at 
determining whether natural disasters might contribute to the oiliness of the rags, provide 
the spark, or some combination of the two. As a preliminary analysis, we created and 
incorporated a natural disasters variable into the FASE analysis, resulting in the plot of 
the conditional probability shown in Figure 3-2. The “disaster index” is a normalized 
linear combination of number of persons killed, injured, made homeless, and otherwise 
affected by the disaster, along with a dollar cost estimate fkom the database. The 
coefficients of the components were arbitrary for this first-look analysis, which we intend 
to revisit with more rigor. 
Figure 3-2. Conditional probabilities of conflict versus 
disaster index. 
Taken at face value, this plot suggests that below-median disasters have no 
discernible effect on the likelihood of conflict. It is notable that the largest disasters in the 
database are associated with the highest likelihood of conflict, but data are too sparse for 
any defmitive statement. 
Our incorporation of disasters into the FASE analysis is suspect because this 
approach deviates from the premise of O’Brien’s model. He uses macrostructural 
variables to forecast instability irrespective of any initiating event leading to actual 
conflict, whereas we propose disasters as an initiating event. Thus, we should estimate 
the interactive effects of disasters in conjunction with other factors. We will discuss this 
issue further in Section 3.3.4. 
3.3 Logistic Analysis of Instability 
Here, we revisit O’Brien’s model of instability, but we substitute statistical 
regression methods in place of FASE for analyzing the data. Statistical regression 
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methods have been the most common empirical methods for this line of research. Our 
goal is to explore second-order effects of the independent variables on instability to more 
accurately and usefully analyze causal relationships. 
Logistic regression models estimate odds ratios for each independent variable. The 
odds ratios represent the marginal change in the likelihood of the event (in this case, 
instability) occurring in response to a unit increase in the independent variable. Each odds 
ratio for each parameter has an associated standard-error estimate, which we use to 
compute confidence intervals. When two or more independent variables are highly 
correlated, the standard errors can be large, leading to very wide confidence intervals, 
which means that we cannot say anything meaningful about the impact of those 
independent variables on the dependent variable. 
O’Brien sought to avoid this problem of multicolinearity by introducing FASE. 
However, we find that we obtain reasonably stable estimates with reasonably narrow 
confidence intervals using logistic regression. Further, we can better parameterize 
relationships that change across the range of some of the independent variables. Some of 
our statistical results correspond to O’Brien’s conclusions, but others contradict 
O’Brien’s conclusions and correspond more closely to the results and conclusions 
presented by Paul Collier (2000) at the World Bank. 
3.3.1 Method and Statistical Model 
We explore the relationship between conflict and macrostructural factors using a 
series of logistic regression models. We explore three classes of models, which vary 
based on how we define the independent variable and which country-year observations 
we include in the data sample. For each class of model, we explore three specifications, 
which vary based on how we structure the independent variables. The result is a set of 
nine statistical regression models for broad comparison, which demonstrate the stability 
of our statistical representation of the underlying relationships. We identify the nine 
regression models in the first column of Table 3-2 using a two-part naming convention. 
Each model is identified by a number corresponding to one of three classes: crisis, 
conflict, or intensity. The identification also includes a letter corresponding to the three 
specifications. Thus, for example, model class 1 identifies the crisis class and has three 
specifications, namely 1-A, 1-B, and 1-C. Note that both the classes and specifications 
are defined in more detail throughout this discussion. 
Table 3-2. Overview of Regression Models 
Model 
ID 
Social Prior conflict 
Regression homogeneity lag indicator Measure of Instability (independent variable) method (# regimes) (included) 
Crisis: 
(excludes war; armed conflict with troops) 
1 -c 
Logistic 
Yes 
Recall that regression analysis requires the analyst to define a dependent variable as 
a mathematical function of one or more independent variables. Based on the explicit form 
of the function selected by the analyst, the regression uses a best-fit technique to identify 
the parameters that quantify the relationship between the dependent variable and each of 
the independent variables. The estimated relationships will vary based on the specified 
functional form, the choice of dependent and independent variables, and the selection of 
sample data. We vary these choices to obtain the nine variations listed in Table 3-2. The 
remainder of Section 3.3.1 is devoted to describing the method and reasoning behind the 
nine regression models described in Table 3-2. Section 3.3.1.1 describes the measures of 
instability listed in the second column of the table. These measures directly correspond to 
the regression methods listed in the third column of the table, 
2-A 
2-B 
2-c 
3-A 
3-B 
3-c 
Section 3.3.1.2 describes the potential effect on instability of dominant social groups. 
We estimate this effect based on the proportion of the population belonging to the largest 
social group, and allow this effect to differ when the proportion falls into one of two or 
three ranges. The largest social group falls into the first range when it does not constitute 
a substantial majority of the population, it falls into the second range when it does 
constitute a substantial majority, and it falls into the third range when it constitutes an 
overwhelming majority encompassing nearly the entire population. The fourth column in 
Table 3-2 indicates whether we allow for two ranges (first and second) or three ranges for 
estimating the marginal impact of an expanding largest social group on instability. 
2 No 
Logistic 3 No 
3 Yes 
2 No 
Linear 3 No 
3 Yes 
Conflict 
(includes war; armed conflict with troops) 
Intensity 
(maps KOSIMO level to a unit interval) 
Section 3.3.1.3 describes the role of prior instability as a factor for current instability, 
corresponding to the lag indicator listed in the fifth column of the table. Section 3.3.1.4 
lists the independent variables obtained from O’Brien for use in this analysis. 
The regression results for model class 1 (crisis) and model class 2 (conflict) are 
presented and interpreted in Section 3.3.2, followed by the results for model class 3 
(intensity) in Section 3.3.4. 
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3.3.1 .I Dependent Variable: Instability 
The three classes of models listed in Table 3-2 differ, among other ways, by the 
choice of dependent variable. Equation (3.1) defines a binomial dependent variable for 
model class 1. The variable equals 0 when there are no crises (KOSIMO level l), it 
equals 1 in the occurrence of crisis (KOSIMO level 2) or severe crisis (KOSIMO level 3), 
and it excludes all country-year observations corresponding to armed conflict (KOSIMO 
level 4). 
{: KOSIMO = O  1 
crisis = KOSIMO = 2,3 . 
-, KOSIMO = 4  
In the second model, we define instability as a binomial occurrence of any form of 
conflict. Equation (3.2) defines a binomial dependent variable for model class 2. The 
variable equals 0 when there are no crises (KOSIMO level l), and it equals 1 in the 
occurrence of crisis (KOSIMO level 2), severe crisis (KOSIMO level 3), or armed 
conflict (KOSIMO level 4). 
KOSIMO = 1 
KOSIMO = 2,3,4 
conflict = 
We excluded observations corresponding to armed conflict in model class 1 and 
included such observations in model class 2 to determine whether such differences in 
specification lead to vastly different estimates of causal relationships. Under O’Brien’s 
supposition that various forms of conflict are linked and can be mapped to a linear 
representation of instability, we would not expect the underlying causal relationships to 
vary between the two models. However, if different forms of conflict are orthogonal with 
respect to underlying causal factors, then the results should vary between these two 
models. 
To further examine O’Brien’s supposition, we explored a very crude third model 
(model class 3) in which we define intensity by projecting instability into a unit interval: 
intensity = 
0, KOSIMO = O  
1/3, KOSIMO = 2 
2/3, KOSIMO = 3 
1, KOSIMO = 4 
(3.3) 
3.3.1.2 Social Groups 
when one social group, such as an ethnic group or a religious group, encompasses a 
O’Brien and others, like Collier at the World Bank, suggest that conflict can arise 
majority of the population and can therefore oppress minority groups. Indeed, the FASE 
plots in Figure 3-1 corresponding to the percent of largest ethnic group and the percent of 
largest religious group appear to demonstrate an increase in instability (conditional 
probability of conflict) as the percentage of those groups increases from 60% to the range 
of 75-90%. 
The suggested causal effect of social-group size, which is supported by the FASE 
plots, implies that the impact of social-group size on instability varies with the level of 
homogeneity. In a heterogeneous society, there is no majority to oppress the rest of the 
population. In a society that is almost completely homogeneous, there are not sufficient 
minorities to respond to oppression in a significant manner. In the intermediate range, 
however, when the largest social group constitutes a substantial majority, we expect to 
see greater instability. Figure 3-3 illustrates this expected varying homogeneity-instability 
relationship, with a rising risk of crisis in the intermediate range as the largest social 
group expands from 60% to 85% of the population. 
Marginal 
Risk of 
Crisis 
Proportion of 
60% 85% Population 
Figure 3-3. Impact of ethnic homogeneity on risk of crisis. 
We use linear spline functions to allow for such nonlinear relationships, as depicted 
in Figure 3-3, in our regression models. We estimate different relationships between 
instability and the proportion of the population belonging to the largest social (ethnic or 
religious) group, depending on whether the largest group constitutes a majority, and 
whether a significant proportion of the population belongs to minority groups. 
In our models, we (somewhat arbitrarily) asserted that the largest social group 
constitutes a majority if it exceeds 60% of the population. We also (somewhat arbitrarily) 
asserted that minority groups were significant if the largest social group did not exceed 
85%. Of course, there are many more rigorous statistical methods for determining such 
thresholds. A better approach might be to search for the most [statistically] efficient 
change point. We also attempted to use nonlinear models of tipping points, such as 
second-order and cross-order variables. However, our approach was expedient, seemed 
reasonable given the anecdotal discussions in the literature, and yielded confirmatory, 
albeit preliminary, results. 
3.3.1.3 Prior Instability 
O’Brien incorporates a variable calculated as the percentage of history spent in 
conflict; the corresponding FASE conditional-probability plot is shown in the last graph 
of Figure 3-1 (labeled “% history in conflict”). O’Brien describes this variable as a cross- 
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country, and therefore culturally dependent, proxy for the propensity of a country to 
resolve conflict through violence. Collier (2000) also looks at the propensity of conflict, 
but from an intertemporal, rather than a cross-sectional, perspective. He finds that 
immediately after the end of hostilities associated with civil war there is a 40% chance of 
further conflict. 
We created an autoregressive indicator variable, similar to that used by Collier, to 
denote whether a country was in a state of KOSIMO instability in the previous year. We 
included this variable in three of nine regressions, as specified in the fifth column of 
Table 3-2; the corresponding models are 1-C, 2-C, and 3-C. 
3.3.1.4 Selection of Variables 
data, as follows: 
We model instability as a fimction of several independent variables from O’Brien’s 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6.  
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
index of civil liberty 
index of political rights 
index of democracy 
trade openness 
youth bulge 
life span 
caloric intake 
proportion of largest ethnic group 
proportion of largest religious group 
prior instability 
We use stepwise procedures to help determine which independent variables to 
include in the nine regression models. This process removes variables from the model 
based on the standard error of their influence on instability. We specified a critical P- 
value of O. 15 for removing variables from the model. Removal of a variable implies that 
the variable does not significantly influence instability in a consistent fashion. 
3.3.2 Results for Regression Models 
Table 3-3 shows the results for all nine regression models. Each independent variable 
listed in the leftmost column has up to nine corresponding parameters for the nine 
regression models, with P-values displayed underneath in parentheses. An explanation of 
how to interpret the results follows the table. 
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. 
Table 3-3. Regression Results 
. 
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For model classes 1 and 2, the parameters listed in Table 3-3 are called odds ratios. 
To interpret the results, first recall that odds in standard logistic regressions of a 
dichotomous variable represent the likelihood of an occurrence relative to a 
nonoccurrence. The odds ratio represents the change in the odds due to a unit increase in 
the independent variable. Odds ratios greater than one imply that the odds, and therefore 
probability, are increasing; odds less than one imply the odds are decreasing. In this 
analysis, in which the dependent variable has four levels of intensity, the “odds” are the 
likelihood that instability will escalate to the next level of intensity. For example, the 
estimated odds ratio for life expectancy is 0.97, or 97%, which implies that a unit 
increase in life expectancy will be associated with a decrease in the odds of conflict by 
3%. In this case, a unit increase in life expectancy is represented by one year. So, a one- 
year increase in life expectancy will decrease the odds of conflict by 3%. 
Empty cells in Table 3-3 denote that an independent variable was omitted from the 
full model by design. Cells containing “--” denote that the independent variable was 
removed from the model by the stepwise procedure. For model classes 1 and 2 (logistic 
regression), the listed parameters represent odds ratios; for model class 3 (linear 
regression), the listed parameters are coefficients. 
The stepwise procedure removed the political rights variable from every regression 
model, probably because this variable is 90% correlated with both the civil liberties 
variable and the democracy variable. The stepwise procedure also removed the life 
expectancy variable from most of the regressions. This variable is most highly correlated 
with the calories variable, but only at 75%. Since we have no strong theory or anecdote 
to suggest that life expectancy is strongly related to instability, we are not surprised that it 
was dropped. 
3.3.2.1 Interpreting the Logistic Results 
model classes 1 (crisis) and 2 (conflict). We interpret the results as follows: 
The odds-ratio estimates are relatively stable across the six logistic regressions for 
The civil liberties index has seven possible values. We find that an incremental 
decrease in the civil liberties index roughly doubles the odds of instability. We 
find this result in Table 3-3 by examining the row named “civil liberty,” for which 
the first six columns (models 1 and 2) show odds ratios near 2. In the case of 
model 1-C, the odds ratio is only 1.54, which implies that the odds of instability 
increase by 54% in response to an incremental decrease in civil liberties. 
The democracy index has 21 possible values. We find that an incremental 
increase in the democracy index increases the odds of instability by roughly 10- 
15%. 
The trade openness variable ranges from 0.09 to 2.82 in our sample. We find that 
a unit increase in trade openness, say, from 1.0 to 2.0, decreases the odds of 
instability by 85%. Figure 3-4 illustrates that most of the marginal risk is removed 
by progressing halfway up the trade openness scale. 
Figure 34. Likelihood of instability versus 
trade openness. 
The youth bulge ranges from 0.46 to 1.9 in our sample. We find that increasing 
the youth bulge from the bottom to the top of this range roughly triples the odds 
of instability. 
The caloric intake ranges kom 1,602 to 3,756 in our sample. The results imply 
that a 100-calorie increase actually increases the marginal likelihood of conflict 
by 8-14%. To better capture the true relationship between calories and instability, 
we ran a subsequent regression model (not shown) that estimated the relationship 
between calories and instability for three segments of caloric intake: (1) less than 
2,000 calories, (2) from 2,000 to 3,000 calories, and (3) above 3,000 calories. This 
modification had negligible impacts to OUT other conclusions, but estimated that 
marginal instability declines over the lower range of caloric intake and stabilizes 
as a nation approaches the median caloric intake of 2,500 calories, as illustrated in 
Figure 3-5. The findings from this modification suggest that increases in caloric 
intake decrease the marginal likelihood of conflict. 
15 20 25 30 35 40 
cakries (1 00) 
Figure 3-5. Likelihood of instability versus 
average daily calories. 
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3.3.2.2 Social Groups 
We analyzed the marginal likelihood of instability with respect to social-group size 
for three ranges of group size. In range 1, the largest social group encompasses less than 
60% of the population; in range 2, the largest social group encompasses more. than 60% 
but less than 85% of the population; and in range 3, the largest social group encompasses 
more than 85% of the population. 
We estimated the marginal instability with respect to both ethnic and religious 
groupings. As expected, the marginal instability in both cases increases for majority 
group size in the range of 60% to 85%, then decreases for majority group size above 
85%. 
The plots in Figure 3-6 show the estimated relationships between group size and 
instability. We are particularly interested in the red plots obtained from model 2-B, which 
support our proposition that instability will increase with respect to a group majority until 
the minority becomes too small to respond to oppression in a significant manner. For 
comparison, we included the blue plots obtained fiom model 2-A, which demonstrate the 
potential errors that can result if one fails to sufficiently allow for nonlinear relationships. 
I Ethnic Spline 
%largest e t h i c  group 
..rdelZ-A-odelZ.B 
Religious Spline I 
Figure 36. Marginal likelihood of conflict versus group size. 
3.3.3 Intensity of Instability: Model and Results 
transfoming the maximum KOSIMO value into a new variable intensiw E [0, 13. The 
stepwise procedure omitted democracy, youth bulge, political rights, and trade openness 
from the model. The estimated coefficients for all independent variables are significant at 
the 95% confidence level. The R2 of 70% indicates that the model explains 70% of the 
variation in intensiw across countries and years. 
We ran a very crude linear regression model of intensity of instability by 
36 
Table 3-4. Regression Results for Intensity 
a 
Number of obs = 1567 
-------------+------------------------------ F( 9, 1557) = 400.66 
Model I 131.564478 9 14.6182754 Prob > F = 0.0000 
Residual 1 56.808213 1557 .036485686 R-squared = 0.6984 
-------------+------------------------------ Adj R-squared = 0.6967 
Total 1 188.372691 1566 .120289075 Root MSE = .19101 
Source 1 ss df MS 
priorconfl-t I 
libert 
calor 
life 
ethnic 
ethnicx 
ethnic 1 
relign 
relignx 
constant 
............................................................. 
Coef. Std. Err. t P>ltl [95% Conf. Interval] 
.5828934 .0107285 54.33 0.000 .5618496 .6039373 
--------------------____________________--------------------- 
I .0152409 .003883 3.93 0.000 .0076245 .0228573 
I -.0000373 .0000153 -2.43 0.015 -.0000674 -7.21e-06 
I .0015866 .0007498 2.12 0.034 .0001159 .0030573 
I .0015435 .000767 2.01 0.044 .0000391 .0030479 
I .3566995 .0665896 5.36 0.000 .2260848 .4873143 
I .001002 .000368 2.72 0.007 .0002801 .0017238 
I -.0050837 .0009852 -5.16 0.000 -.0070161 -.0031513 
I -.0015189 .0007663 -1.98 0.048 -.0030219 -.0000159 
I -.0310817 .0610057 -0.51 0.610 -.1507437 .0885802 
This model accurately predicted the KOSIMO intensity level in 78% of the cases in 
the sample. 
Note that in Table 3-4 and in other similar tables presented subsequently in this 
discussion, we list variables beginning with “ethnic” and appended with a number, an 
alphabetic character, or both. The definitions of these variables are as follows: 
ethnic1 = 0 when ethnic < 60% 
ethnic1 = 1 when ethnic > 60% 
ethnic2 = 0 when ethnic < 85% 
ethnic2 = 1 when ethnic > 85% 
ethnicx = ethnic * ethnic1 
ethnicx2 = ethnic * ethnic2 
Those variables appended with a single number (ethnic 1 and ethnic2) are Bernoulli 
variables, which are “yesho” or “ O h ”  variables. Such variables thus have two possible 
outcomes. 
We use the same definitional approach described above for ethnic-related variables 
for those variables listed in the tables that are associated with religion, e.g., relign, 
relignl, relignx, etc. 
3.3.4 Natural Disasters 
introducing natural disasters into our analysis. We suggest that natural disasters escalate 
instability when a significant group of survivors is impacted by death, injury, 
homelessness, or similar effects. Specifically, we introduce four new variables 
representing the three-year average of the three previous years of the number of people 
(1) killed, (2) injured, (3) left homeless, and (4) otherwise affected by a natural disaster. 
We explore the analogy of oily rags waiting for a spark to set them ablaze by 
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We extracted data from the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT), which is made 
available on the Worldwide Web by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters (CRED) of the WHO (World Health Organization). These data are available in 
spreadsheet form (see CRED 2004). 
When previous years were unavailable, we used a one- or two-year average instead 
of a three-year average. We introduced these variables into the conflict model identified 
as model 2-B. Table 3-5 shows the regression results. 
Table 3-5. Logistic Estimation of the Occurrence of Conflict Including 
Variables Representing Number Killed and Injured in Disasters 
Logit estimates 
Log likelihood = -759.82368 
Number of obs = 1567 
Pseudo R2 ~ 0.2513 ~ 
libert 1 
demo I 
youth 1 
calor I 
calor2 I 
calor3 I 
ethnic I 
ethnic1 I 
ethnicx I 
ethnic2 
ethnicx2 
relign 
relignl 
relignx 
relign2 
relignx2 
killed 
injured 
open I 
2.451068 
1.150886 
.2418304 
2.949534 
.8888329 
1.053206 
1.051157 
.9389448 
.0006801 
1.137359 
1588.092 
.go82237 
.8201978 
1.16e-06 
1.298315 
10168.69 
.go17984 
1.024814 
1.046087 
.2137089 
.0217512 
.0566301 
1.012244 
.0390172 
.0158496 
.0101168 
.0101647 
.0013363 
.0310091 
4943.214 
.0328139 
.0263593 
2.28e-06 
.0465447 
25473.69 
.0256697 
.0105918 
.0115067 
10.28 
7.44 
-6.06 
3.15 
-2.68 
3.44 
5.18 
-5.82 
-3.71 
4.72 
2.37 
-2.66 
-6.17 
-6.96 
7.28 
3.68 
-3.63 
2.37 
4.10 
0.000 
0 . 0 0 0  
0.000 
0.002 
0.007 
0.001 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.018 
0.008 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.000 
0.018 
0.000 
2.066042 
1.109034 
.1528209 
1.505329 
.8155579 
1.022595 
1.031514 
.9192323 
.0000145 
1.078177 
3.55928 
.846134 
.770128 
2.49e-08 
1.21022 
74.97423 
.8528644 
1.004263 
1.023775 
2.907849 
1.194317 
.3826828 
5.779303 
.9686913 
1.084734 
1.071174 
.95908 
.0319914 
1.199789 
708580.5 
.9748697 
.8735229 
.0000545 
1.392822 
1379171 
.9535401 
1.045785 
1.068884 
The impacts of a natural disaster are generally local or regional, and their likelihood 
to escalate instability depends on the particulars of the region rather than on the size of 
the population residing within the national border. Therefore, we do not normalize with 
respect to popu~ation.~ 
We estimated a regression model using both linear and log-linear transformations of 
the disaster variables. In both cases, the stepwise procedure found that the variables for 
homeless and otherwise affected were not significant, and the variables for killed and 
injured had an increasing effect on instability. The insignificance of the variables for 
homeless and otherwise affected was clearest in the model of log-linear transformations, 
where the stepwise procedure discarded those two variables at 64% and 70% significance 
levels, respectively. There are several reasons why these variables might have such high 
The previous analysis in Section 3.2.3 was based on a composite variable that was normalized with 3 
respect to population. 
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standard errors, including the likelihood that the data for these two variables are not 
reliable and consistent across countries. Regardless of why those two variables were 
discarded, we ultimately decided that the model presented above, resulting from log- 
linear transformations of the data, was the more conservative model. The variables for 
killed and injured were constructed as follows: If nit represents the number of deaths in 
the ith country in year t, then our regression variable for deaths is 
Xit = In(( nit + nit-1 + nit-2 )/3). 
As before, the stepwise procedure discards political rights and life expectancy from 
the model. Additionally, the procedure discards homeless and otherwise-affected 
casualties. The relationships estimated in the previous model (2-B) hold. Additionally, we 
find that a percentage increase in the number killed and injured increases the odds of 
instability by 2% and 4%, respectively. 
3.3.5 Extra pol at ion and Forecast i ng 
O’Brien presents his model as a tool for forecasting future instability from prior 
historic factors. He uses split samples whereby he trains the model using data from an 
initial time period, extrapolates (forecasts) to a subsequent time period, and compares his 
forecasts with actual KOSIMO instability values. We conducted a similar experiment 
using our logistic model. 
In preparation for a split-sample forecasting experiment, we first explored the 
model’s ability to predict within-sample, and to extrapolate cross-sectionally to countries 
and years that were excluded from the regression sample due to missing data. We ran two 
regression models for this preliminary step. 
First, we ran the model from Section 3.3.4 with 1567 complete country-year 
observations, denoted as model A in Table 3-6. Then we extrapolated the probability of 
instability in the 1938 country years that had been omitted from the regression by 
populating missing data with the global mean of the respective independent variable. This 
model accurately forecasted instability in 77% of the country years in the regression 
sample and in 70% of the country years that were not in the regression sample. 
Second, we added an additional variable to account for prior conflict. O’Brien and 
Collier both include prior conflict as a factor in their model, arguing that prior conflict 
propagates instability. O’Brien addresses the issue by including a variable to represent 
the proportion of sample years that a country has spent in instability. We excluded that 
variable from our model because although statistically significant, the variable obtained 
an odds ratio approximately equal to one and added very little to the R2. Rather, we 
address the issue here by introducing an indicator variable to indicate whether the country 
was unstable in the previous year (see model B in Table 3-6). This variable increased the 
R2 from 25% to 75%, increased the forecast accuracy within-sample from 77% to 95%, 
and increased the forecast accuracy out-of-sample from 70% to 89%. 
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Table 3-6. Statistical Impact of Prior-Conflict Variable 
A 
B 
No 25% % correct 77% 70% 73% 
Yes 75% % correct 95% 89% 92% 
Having explored our baseline, we now conduct a variation of one of O’Brien’s 
experiments in which he estimated based on a sample from 1975-89 and forecasted for 
the period 1990-94. Table 3-7 shows the accuracy of our forecasts using model A, which 
excludes a variable denoting prior instability. Although our sample is much smaller than 
O’Brien’s, we obtain a forecast accuracy of 74% compared to O’Brien’s accuracy of 
77%. The number of country-year observations is listed in parentheses below the 
forecast-accuracy percentage. 
Table 3-7. Forecast Accuracy Excluding the Prior- 
Conflict Variable 
Table 3-8 shows that accuracy increases substantially when we include our prior- 
conflict variable, increasing accuracy from the 6040% range in model A to the mid-90% 
range in model B. 
Table 3-8. Forecast Accuracy Including the Prior- 
Conflict Variable 
We find that including a variable to represent prior instability can greatly increase 
the forecast accuracy of a model, even when using a much smaller sample of countries 
and even when extrapolating to other countries outside of the original sample. 
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3.3.6 Forecasting Impacts of Caloric Reductions 
We are ultimately interested in understanding the impacts of climate change on 
social instability. One example of such a climate change might be desertification, leading 
to food reduction. As a crude experiment, we compare instability forecasts under sample 
conditions against the instability forecasts when daily calories per capita are arbitrarily 
reduced. 
t 
For this experiment, we exclude the autoregressive variable calledprior conflict for a 
more honest representation of the underlying factors of instability. We further explore the 
role of consumption more deeply by introducing the following interaction terms: 
caloriescivil liberty, calories political rights, calories-democracy, caloriesyouth, and 
calorieslife. 
We estimated the model using data from 1975 through 1989. The results are shown 
in Table 3-9. The stepwise procedure excluded all terms containingyouth bulge and life 
expectancy, as well as the first-order terms democracy and civil liberty. As before, we 
find that calories reduced the odds of instability at a decreasing rate, but this model also 
indicates that calories reduce the odds of instability faster in those countries with lesser 
degrees of democracy, civil liberty, and political rights. 
Table 3-9. Logistic Estimation of the Occurrence of Conflict 
Logit estimates Number of obs = 552 
Log likelihood = -237.4921 Pseudo R2 0.3112 ~ ~ 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
conflict I Odds Ratio Std. E r r .  2 P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
calor 1 .4680991 .0562648 -6.32 0.000 .3698492 .592449 
calor2 I 1.105046 .0324306 3.40 0.001 1.043277 1.170472 
1.0725 1.169242 calor3 I 1.119827 .0246717 5.14 0.000 
1.002291 1.009456 cal-demo I 1.005867 .0018278 3.22 0.001 
cal-libert I 1.036536 .0082882 4.49 0.000 1.020418 1.052908 
cal-rights 1 1.057908 .0234404 2.54 0.011 1.012949 1.104863 
rights I .1923973 .0907347 -3.49 0.000 .0763435 .4848708 
open I .0765448 .0309054 -6.36 0.000 .0346927 .1688859 
ethnic I .8949474 .0173601 -5.72 0.000 .861561 .9296277 
1.101903 1.289447 ethnicx I 1.191992 .0477947 4.38 0.000 
ethnic1 I .0000856 .0002363 -3.39 0.001 3.82e-07 .0191915 
ethnic2 1 .1309745 .0992778 -2.68 0.007 .0296471 .5786175 
relign 1 .7846355 .0468963 -4.06 0.000 .6978999 .8821506 
relignx I 1.461669 .0959263 5.78 0.000 1.285247 1.662309 
relignl I 8.14e-10 2.87e-09 -5.93 0.000 8.07e-13 8.20e-07 
relignx2 I .978393 .0071788 -2.98 0.003 .9644236 .9925647 
To compare the forecasted impacts of caloric reduction on instability, we first 
obtained a set of fitted instability values for the years 1990 through 1994 called ?base. We 
then reduced the calories for all country years by 10% and obtained a new set of fitted 
instability values called ?drop. We then sorted the observations according to ?base. Figure 
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3-7 compares the forecasted probability of conflict under actual calorie levels (blue) 
against the forecasts when calories are reduced by 10% (red). The horizontal axis is 
simply the rank order of the observations when sorted according t0jb-e. We find that the 
caloric reduction increases the estimated odds of instability in every country year. 
Figure 3-7. Logistic response to caloric reductions. 
3.3.6.1 Calorie-Instability Relationship 
We made the previous comparison by assuming a 10% across-the-board reduction in 
calories. We will now estimate a relationship between stability and calories. We do so by 
appending multiple fitted values of the odds of instability for each country year for 
different-sized caloric reductions. 
Figure 3-8 shows the forecasted percent increase in the odds of instability, called 
prise, in response to various percent reductions (0% to 50%) in daily calories per capita. 
We find that the odds of instability generally double for the first 20% reduction in 
calories. To better visualize the impacts of random caloric reductions on expected 
instability, we divide the percent reductions into ten 5% intervals; for example, the first 
interval includes caloric reductions from 0% to 5%, the second interval includes caloric 
reductions from 5% to lo%, etc. We compute the mean percent increase in the odds of 
instability for each interval, called meankrise), and plot these in the odds of instability 
by about 75%, but the average impact of larger-percentage caloric reductions converges 
at about a 100% increase in the odds of instability . 
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Figure 3-8. Forecasted probabilities of conflict resulting 
from caloric reductions. 
We complete this crude extrapolation exercise by fitting a regression , ot shown) of 
the percent rise in Winstability) with respect to several variables including the percent 
reduction in calories. Figure 3-9 shows the marginal quadratic relationship between these; 
the vertical axis represents the percent rise in Pr(instability), and the horizontal axis refers 
to the percent reduction in calories. This chart shows that caloric reductions cause the 
forecasted likelihood of conflict to increase at a decreasing rate with respect to the 
Dercent reduction in calories. 
Figure 3-9. Fitted relationship of conflict versus caloric 
reductions. 
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3.3.7 Remarks 
These exercises demonstrate that relatively simple statistical models can generate 
forecasts in and out of sample, and give insight into the underlying causal structure of 
instability with respect to measurable macrostructural variables. 
Despite this series of statistical exercises, we are skeptical of purely correlative 
methods for analyzing conflict factors. We suggest that fitted and actual values of 
instability measures should be examined in the context of case studies of the various 
countries in our samples. 
Further, we are skeptical of these statistical models because the defmition of 
instability provided by KOSIMO is so broad and could possibly comprise a variety of 
conflicting relationships with the independent variables. Therefore, although we could 
and should investigate the design of these models more carefully, it seems more prudent 
to explore the defmitions of conflict. 
3.4 Orthogonal Types of Conflict 
In Sections 3.1 through 3.3, we analyzed KOSIMO instability as a function of 
several underlying independent variables. Although it was a useful scoping exercise, we 
are skeptical of the reliability and value of analyzing a single all-encompassing index of 
instability. 
We suggest that instances of conflict fall along one or more orthogonal axes of instability 
(as illustrated in Figure 3-10), and that meaningful empirical study should take this into 
account. Collier (2000) presents a model that is consistent with our suggestion by limiting 
his analysis to a single axis: “civil war.” 
War I external conflict 
I wartime 
revolution , Internal violence 
Ethnic or religious partisans Civil war 
Figure 3-10. Orthogonal conflict space. 
The COW (Correlates of War) database contains more objective definitions of 
conflict, which are clearer for our purposes than those provided by KOSIMO. However 
our quick perusal seems to indicate that the data are incomplete. The COW database 
compiles a list of records corresponding to conflicts, but this list does not examine the 
ongoing conflict-related characteristics of a region or country, outside of an instance of 
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documented conflict. Therefore, there are no defined steps for documenting and 
measuring the completeness of the list. 
3.4.1 Civil War Versus Local Conflict 
The COW database contains intrastate war data for 1816-1997 (see COW 2004). 
COW classifies intrastate wars into three categories: (1) civil war for control of the 
central government, (2) conflict over local issues, and (3) intercommunal conflict. 
We sought to determine whether the determinants are different for each type of 
conflict. Thus, we merged the COW data with the O’Brien data set. Once merged, the 
data contained incidences of civil war and local-issues conflict, but no incidences of 
intercommunal conflict for the country years in the data set. We created two new 
Bernoulli variables (“yesho” or “ O h ”  variables, which have two possible outcomes) for 
each country year in the O‘Brien data. The first variable lists whether the state was 
engaged in civil war during each year, and the second variable lists whether the state was 
engaged in conflict over local issues. Based on several runs, we decided to exclude 
political rights, life span, and youth bulge from the option set of variables. 
3.4.2 Logistic Model of Civil War 
independent variables are significant at the 95% confidence level. The pseudo R2 (a 
property of logistic regression that is analogous to the R2 of linear regressions) indicates 
that the model explains 32% of the variation in the occurrence of civil war across 
countries and years. This model accurately predicted civil war in about 95% of the cases 
in the sample. 
The statistical results are contained in Table 3-10. The estimated odds ratios for most 
Table 3-10. Logistic Estimation of Occurrences of Civil War 
Logit estimates 
Log likelihood = -192.34577 
____________________-------. 
civilwar I Odds Ratio 
libert I 1.343757 
relignl 1 .0000218 
open 1 .0166382 
calor 1 .9971128 
ethnic 1 1.033127 
ethnicx 1 .9299716 
ethnic1 I 412.6841 
relign I .9444142 
relignx I 1.156064 
-------------+-------------. 
Std. Err. 
.1396492 
.000074 
.0115927 
.0004565 
.0218709 
.0242554 
697.0897 
.0574102 
.073745 
Number of obs = 1501 
Pseudo R2 - 0.32 
2 P>lzl [95% Conf. Interval] 
2.84 0.004 1.096125 1.647333 
2.85e-08 .0167479 -3.17 0.002 
-5.88 0.000 .0042465 .0651905 
-6.32 0.000 .9962185 .9980079 
1.54 0.124 .9911376 1.076895 
-2.78 0.005 .8836266 .9787474 
3.57 0.000 15.0592 11309.25 
-0.94 0.347 .8383371 1.063914 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
2.27 0.023 1.020197 1.310025 
____________________- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
The following provides an interpretation of the results: 
We found that an incremental move down the civil liberties index increased the 
risk of civil war by 34%. 
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3.4.3 
The stepwise procedure removed democracy from the list of variables. 
We found that a unit increase in trade openness decreases the risk of conflict by 
98%. 
Unlike the previous models using KOSIMO measures of conflict, we now find 
that a unit increase in calories decreases the risk of conflict by 0.3%. 
We find that a 1% increase in the size of the largest religious group decreases 
the odds of conflict by nearly 6% when under the 60% threshold, which we derive 
by noting that the odds ratio for the religious-group variable is roughly 94%. That 
is, the odds of conflict after a 1% increase in the size of the largest religious group 
are 94% as high as (or 6% lower than) the odds before the increase in the group 
size. However, an equal 1% increase in group size increases the odds by 10% 
when above the 60% threshold, which we derive by taking the product of odds 
ratios for the variables named “relign” and “relignx” (which appear in several of 
the tables in Section 3) because relign gives the underlying odds ratio, and relignx 
gives the change in the odds ratio when relign > 60%. This product of these odds 
ratio, in this case, is roughly 1 lo%, which implies that the odds of conflict are 
10% higher after a 1% increase in group size than before the increase in group 
size. 
The opposite path occurs for ethnic homogeneity. We find that a 1% increase in 
the size of the largest ethnic group increases the odds of conflict by 3% when 
under the 60% threshold, which we obtain by noting than the odds ratio for 
“ethnic” is 103%. However, a 1% increase in the size of the largest ethnic 
group decreases the odds of conflict by 4% when above the 60% threshold, which 
we obtain from the product of “ethnic” and “ethnicx”. 
Logistic Model of Local War 
The statistical results for local war, identifying conflict over local issues, are 
contained in Table 3- 1 1. The estimated odds ratios for all independent variables are 
significant at the 95% confidence level. The pseudo R2 indicates that the model explains 
41% of the variation in the occurrence of local war across countries and years. This 
model accurately predicted local war in about 97% of the cases in the sample. 
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Table 3-1 1. Logistic Estimation of Occurrences of Local War 
. 
Logit estimates 
Log likelihood = -122.82354 
Number of obs = 1812 
Pseudo R2 ~ 0.417 ~ 
localwar 
interwar 
libert 
re 1 ignl 
calor 
ethnic 
ethnicx 
relign 
relignx 
- - - - _ _ _ _ _ _ - - -  
1 Odds Ratio 
1 8.930313 
1 2.548555 
I 1.34e-06 
I .9990791 
1 .778308 
1 1.182376 
1 .8659086 
I 1.24813 
Std. E r r .  2 P>lzl 
7.123913 2.74 0.006 
.3963734 6.02 0.000 
5.61e-06 -3.24 0.001 
.0004284 -2.15 0.032 
.0300449 -6.49 0.000 
.0310884 6.37 0.000 
.0938289 2.95 0.003 
.0607887 -2.05 0.040 
[95% Conf. Interval] 
1.87001 42.6471 
1.878918 3.456848 
3.80e-10 .00476 
.9982399 .9999191 
.7215936 .8394799 
1.122988 1.244906 
.7545983 .9936382 
1.077136 1.446271 
.-------______------- 
In this model, we found a strong inverse relationship between trade openness and 
local war. Indeed, there was a fully determined correspondence between local war and 
trade openness for 437 observations, which were therefore omitted from the sample by 
the statistics package due to lack of variation. In response, we took this relationship 
between local war and trade openness as given, and removed the variable from the model 
to estimate on a larger sample. This step of removing a significant variable from the 
model violates certain assumptions of the model but did not drastically affect the results. 
The following provides an interpretation of the results: 
We found that an incremental 17% move down the civil liberties index more than 
doubles the risk of local war. 
The stepwise procedure removed democracy from the list of variables. 
Similar to the model of civil war, we now find that a unit increase in calories 
decreases the risk of conflict by 0.1 %. Although statistically significant, this 
result implies that the effects on the likelihood of conflict due to moderate 
increases in caloric intake will be of negligible magnitude. 
As in the model of local war, we find that a 1% increase in the size of the largest 
religious group decreases the risk of conflict by 14% when under the 60% 
threshold, but increases the risk by 10% when above the 60% threshold. 
Unlike the model of civil war, ethnic homogeneity follows the same path as 
religious homogeneity. We find that a 1% increase in the size of the largest ethnic 
group decreases the risk of conflict by 22% when under the 60% threshold, and 
continues to decrease the risk by 4% when above the 60% threshold. 
We included an additional variable in the model of local war: the existence of 
international war. We find that local wars are nine times more likely to occur 
when the national government is at war with another country. 
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3.5 Remarks 
We found significant relationships between various macrostructural factors and the 
likelihood of instability. We examined various proxies for instability, These proxies for 
instability include the subjective KOSIMO index, which captures a broad spectrum of 
type of conflict and includes nonviolent conflicts, and objective measures of the 
occurrences of specifically defined types of conflict, such as civil and local wars. 
We find that there is a rich body of empirical work that will support subsequent 
efforts to model social responses to changes in economic and political environments. 
Although we did not significantly represent or extend the state of this art, we do find that 
the current conflict research faces common limitations due to a reliance on conventional 
statistical methods. Such limitations arise from lack of data, an inability to properly 
account for very complex relationships, and an assumption that history is representative 
of the future. We hold that agent-based and system-based modeling approaches will draw 
from the existing research and extend our ability to model and analyze prospective future 
scenarios stemming from climate change. 
We derived some crude empirical findings and conducted some basic forecasting 
experiments to support our overarching goal to understand climate effects on instability. 
Empirically, the data suggest that stability can degrade in response to natural disasters 
that cause deaths and injuries, and in response to decline in average daily calories. For the 
case of caloric reductions, we conducted simple experiments in which we reduced the 
average daily calories and forecasted the likelihood of conflict in different countries. 
Although further refinements and testing are necessary, these exercises demonstrate our 
ability to incorporate social, political, and economic data into a framework to forecast the 
effects of certain climate-related changes. Ultimately, such exercises might help 
parameterize or verify subsequent agent-based models, and provide a baseline for 
identifying and measuring the greater realism afforded by agent-based models. 
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4 Using Recent Advances in Behavioral 
Analysis to Address Climatic Impact on 
Conflict 
4.1 Introduction 
This exploratory research reviews those methods and approaches that are potentially 
most appropriate for describing the impacts of climate change on societal stress and 
conflict. While the complete simulation of such impacts would presumably use 
sophisticated agent-based simulation, this exploratory effort examines advances in 
behavioral and statistical analysis for guidance in those future efforts. 
4.1 .I Reviewed Methods 
The recent Nobel Prize-winning work of Clive Granger, Robert Engel, and Daniel 
McFadden provides new and powerful approaches for understanding historical and 
statistical data. The Granger/Engel work focuses on cointegration. Cointegration 
separates the phenomena that remain functioning during dramatic change from those that 
break down and cause new (possibly counterproductive) responses. Further, cointegration 
is based on causality, in a temporal sense: the future and the present cannot affect the 
past. Granger causality can determine the direction and legitimacy of implied causal 
relationships. The causal logic correctly implies stocks, or levels, of physical and 
informational quantities that dominate the human decision-making process. Granger 
causality can invalidate assumed relationships among phenomena and data, but it cannot 
truly prove causality. Although only introduced within this work, Bayesian causal 
discovery (BCD) appears to have the ability to actually determine the true causal 
relationships and, thereby, (with cointegration techniques) increases the validity of 
simulating impacts to levels previously unimaginable. Lastly, qualitative choice theory 
(QCT) developed by Daniel McFadden has a long and successhl history of simulating 
human decision making. QCT explicitly includes the uncertainty associated with 
decisions, responses, and the consequences of both. The theory notes the limitations of 
humans to comprehend information, conditions, and stimuli, and can readily include 
irrational behavior and internal preferences and beliefs in simulating human responses. 
Specifically, this effort builds on the work described in Section 3 and focuses on 
conditions that potentially lead to conflict. QCT is a probabilistic method and, therefore, 
directly applicable to portraying the probability of conflict. Similarly, conflict tends to be 
associated with a building up of conditions that generate conflict. Thus, the concepts of 
cointegration and Granger causality would appear to be generally applicable. A literature 
review indicates that cointegration and its associated methods have only been 
peripherally utilized for conflict analysis (Shellman 2004a, 2004b). There is yet no 
reported use of QCT. QCT and its linkage to cointegration represent new and promising 
ground for the analysis of conflict causality and evolution. 
Like the causal analysis described in Section 3, this work uses the O’Brien (2002) 
data set augmented by data from the CRED (Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters [Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium]). Although there are a large number 
of conflict-related data sets, we used only the O’Brien data set to evaluate approaches and 
methodologies because of the limited time frame for conducting these exploratory 
analyses. 
The results of the exploratory analyses presented in this section do indicate the need 
for dynamic considerations where pressures build up, over time. The results also strongly 
suggest the casual relationship between conflict and natural disaster is quite dynamic and 
more complex than aggregate econometric methods can encapsulate. An agent-based 
system can recognize the delayed impact of changes in extreme weather that affect 
societies and their ability to cope with them, given the surrounding physical, economic, 
cultural, and geopolitical constraints. 
4.1.2 Section Overview 
Our discussion of the reviewed methods begins with an introduction to QCT and 
provides an illustrative example using the O’Brien data set. In general, QCT is the prime 
candidate to causally model all human decisions. Next, we introduce cointegration and 
Granger causality with an example of both concepts using the O’Brien data set. 
Cointegration shows that the build-up of historical conditions affects how current 
situations trigger conflict. Cointegration implies the existence of interacting paths that 
need to be addressed with a systems perspective. This type of knowledge is critical in 
establishing principles to limit the potential for conflict escalation. A brief diversion on 
BCD (Bayesian causal discovery) is included to indicate how a more quantified data set 
could be used to ensure agent-based simulation correctly reflects true causal 
relationships. Without a causal understanding of the system, it is impossible to determine 
the validity of any proposed interventions. 
4.2 Qualitative Choice Theory 
QCT has a long history in psychology. This theory has only been fully developed for 
economic and behavioral use through the work of the 2000 Nobel Prize-winner Daniel 
McFadden (McFadden 1 982). Independently of whether an individual is rational, 
irrational, profit maximizing, or satisficing, QCT applies to the decision-making process. 
In an all-encompassing economic sense, we all compare the “value” of one choice to 
others. QCT simply says that individuals make a choice based on their perception of 
utility regarding those choices. QCT causes any and all information (preferences, tastes, 
culture, costs, etc.) utilized by the individual to define a valid (or at least functional) 
representation of choice behavior. Like BCD (Bayesian causal discovery), QCT starts 
with the data reflecting the conditional probability of a choice given possibly interacting, 
conflicting, and limited information. 
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4.2.1 Probabilistic Decisions under Imperfect Conditions 
be made. It is thus directly applicable to a multiple-agent perspective (for example, the 
Los Alamos National Laboratory [LANL] Transim model). At a societal (or even tribal) 
level, the probability translates to the fraction of the population making a particular 
decision. Theoretically, any form of the probability distribution can act as the basis for 
the analysis. In practice, the Weibul distribution has the greatest numerical ease-of-use 
and has shown itself to be empirically the most likely shape of the actual distribution. The 
Weibul distribution is skewed to the left with a broad tail to the right. This implies that 
while individuals consider higher “cost” or lower “value” options, they tend to focus on 
the lower “cost” and higher “value” options. 
At the individual level, QCT represents the probability that a particular decision will 
People do not have perfect information. A sampling of the population shows 
different perceptions of actual costs and personal preferences. The choice made is called 
random utility maximization, or RUM (McFadden 1986). Figure 4-1 below shows an 
example distribution of perceived price for three technologies (choices). Preferences are 
not included to simplify the example. 
I 
Cost Distributions (Tech 1 -Tech N) 
a 
C 
- -Tech2 0 
c 
a2 
E 
e a 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Price 
Y 
Figure 4-1. Illustrative choice distribution. 
Maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) methods determine the shape of the 
distribution as a function of costs and preferences in the model (McFadden 1986). The 
actual market share is determined by mathematical integration over the distributions 
(McFadden 1974). Nonetheless, the physical process can be understood intuitively. Most 
individuals will perceive technology 1 as less expensive and select it. However, several 
individuals will perceive technology 2 competitive with technology 1 and select 
technology 2. Finally, a small few will perceive technology three as the least expense and 
select it. 
The market share of technology 1 would be as shown in Figure 4-2, as its price 
varies relative to the prices of the other choices. The price ratio depicts the weighted price 
of the other alternatives divided by the price of technology 1. As the price of technology 
1 becomes small compared to the other choices, the market share of technology 1 would 
. 
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go to unity. If the uncertainty is large (as in a residential decision), the slope is gradual. If 
there is significant effort to reduce costs (have less uncertainty), the curve is steeper, as 
shown for industrial choices. If there is perfect information, as assumed in an 
unconstrained linear programming (L-P) framework, then the market share would jump 
fiom 0.0 to 1.0 with the smallest of price differentials. 
*. .".,*"... 
Figure 4-2. Illustrative market-share response. 
4.2.2 QCT Mathematical Basics 
The integration of Figure 4-1 produces the probability of the choice, or in the 
aggregate, the market share, of the i'th choice (hisf) per Figure 4-2. For a Weibul 
distribution, this integral has a closed-form solution: 
MS,= c e'l' 
j=1 
(4.1) 
where U, is the utility of choice i, and e is the base of the natural logarithm. The utility 
function is often written, for example, as a simple linear function of price (Pi) with the 
constant (nonprice) term noted by Train (1986): 
In this case, A would be (assumed constant) nonprice factors of taste and preference for 
the i'th choice. A can also capture the ability to make the choice (e.g., the limitation of 
physician selection in an insurance plan) or the availability of the choice (e.g., the 
availability of corn in the Sahel). Note that B does not have a subscript. It is directly 
related to the uncertainty of the choic+how well the information of the choice set is 
known and understood. The uncertainty of the decision process is the same for all choices 
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in a set because it is an ordinal, and not a cardinal, process that compares all options at 
once. 
There can be a hierarchy of choice, like a binary tree, but the logic is called nesting 
because the decision process is represented as a nested hierarchy of decisions. Each level 
is a choice among all the options of that level (e.g., choosing the flavor of ice cream to 
eat occurs after choosing which place to go for the snack after the decision to go for a 
snack.) Each decision level is self-contained but can be conditional on the level below it. 
The derivation of the theory of QCT requires that all choices at any level are 
mutually exclusive (e.g., the decision to live in Kashmir or migrate to India). Empirically 
this limitation is nonbinding. A classic example is the addition of travel choice by 
painting half of all the buses green and the remaining buses blue. There really has been 
no change in the choices-taking the green bus is no different from taking the blue bus. 
The A of Equation (4.2) can capture this fallacy by simply multiplying the blue-bus and 
green-bus choices, in this example, by 0.5. The same process can often allow the 
complicated nested equations to be reduced to a single layer called a “comb” that requires 
only the single use (and estimation) of Equation (4.1). 
Reducing the uncertainty, increasing the understanding of the choices, and making 
better decisions (as contained in the B term of Equation [4.2]), takes time and effort. The 
benefit may not be worth the effort. When buying a house, a purchaser may want to know 
the price within 1% or less. For a candy bar, a 200% variance in uncertainty is tolerable. 
The consequences of purchasing a house are much more momentous than those of 
purchasing a candy bar. The magnitude of B appears to vary directly with the importance 
of the decision. That importance is the cost of the decision compared to the value of the 
entire output (a labor-year of income for a person and the revenue for a company). 
Data indicate the linear function of Equation (4.2) works well for small variations of 
the input variables, but the actual underlying function is logarithmic. Equation (4.3) is a 
simple logarithmic enhancement of Equation (4.2): 
Ui = A i  + B*ln(Pi). (4.3) 
The use of the logarithm indicates that people can determine relative proportionality but 
not absolute differences in price (or other components of utility). This implication is 
consistent with the previous discussion that B is proportional to the percentage impact it 
has on total outcome. 
If Equation (4.3) is substituted into Equation (4.1) and m is defined as 
mi =exp(Aj), 
then Equation (4.2) becomes 
(4-4) 
. 
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j=l 
c 
* 
Equation (4.5) is consistent with the engineering assessment of options according to the 
distribution of (estimated) cost versus (estimated) performance. The uncertainty of the 
estimate (B)  is also a function of the importance of accuracy. This is the only example 
known where engineeringhcientific theory and economic theory agree. 
While MLE is required for the unbiased estimation of Equation (4.5), within a 
feedback system, ordinary least-square estimation often produces adequate 
parameterization to generate accurate forecasts. 
Note that because the decision process is always ordinal, there is no absolute concept 
of preference. Therefore, one of the mi must be arbitrarily selected as the numaire and set 
to unity. 
The use of QCT seems to force a rigor and a method for defining the implicit or 
explicit decisions associated with a simulation hypothesis. Experience indicates that QCT 
forces a self-consistency of thought and theory that always has a causal description 
consistent with empirical data. 
4.2.3 Testing QCT for Climate-Conflict Impacts 
Building on the work described in Section 3, QCT can simulate the conflict as the 
decision (choice) to actively confront an apparent threat or opportunity based on the 
perceived conditions society or individuals may be using for that choice. The set of 
information available by year and country from O’Brien and CRED data includes the 
following: 
implied level of conflict from KOSIMO 
prior conflict 
political rights metric 
civil liberty metric 
democracy metric 
open society metric 
life expectancy 
youth bulge 
ethnic majority dominance 
religious majority dominance 
calories per capita 
number killed in disasters 
number injured in disasters 
number made homeless in disasters 
number otherwise affected by disasters 
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Realistically, only a fraction of this information contributes to the actual decision to 
engage in conflicts. Some of the variables listed above are surrogates for the actual 
perceived conditions. For example, both the ethnic and religious majority may reflect a 
tension between a majority wanting to protect or enforce its favored institutions and a 
minority that threatens or feels threatened by the majority. Both BCD and cointegration 
provide methods to determine the “correct” causal hypotheses. 
Until statistical analysis shows otherwise, the utility of conflict (Uc) is assumed to be 
a function of all the information (Xi) noted above: 
UC = A + C B i *  ln(X. )  I ,  
where i designates which piece of information is used. Both A and Bi are estimated. If A 
came out to be 0.0, it would imply that the reflect all the relevant causal drivers of the 
conflict. 
For this illustrative analysis, it is assumed that individuals only use current 
information to make decisions. The later Granger causality discussion will consider the 
importance of historical (remembered) information for formulating current decisions. 
Again, the logarithmic form is used to reflect the affine nature of decision. Humans can 
only recognize proportional (relative) changes. There is no absolute measure of 
perceptions or conditions. 
The utility of no conflict (Un) is considered constant and arbitrarily assigned a unity 
value. Because the probability of a choice is based on the ordinal rather than the 
(nonexistent) cardinal comparison of the utilities, the choice of the Un has no impact on 
results. 
Given that this analysis assumes a simplified binary choice (no conflict or conflict), 
the probability of conflict (Pc) is then 
Pc = Exp(Uc)/(exp(Un + exp(Uc)). (4.7) 
For this analysis, the KOSIMO index of conflict is normalized as a continuum 
covering a range of no conflict (0.0) to complete conflict (1 -0). For illustrative purposes, 
the maximum KOSIMO value (4) is assumed to reflect a position halfway to “total 
conflict” and given a value of 0.5. All other values are scaled accordingly to give a 
conflict ratio. At a societal level, the interpretation is that if the conflict ratio is 0.5, then 
50% of the population is involved. At an individual level, this means there is a 50% 
chance the individual has chosen to enter into the conflict. Thus, the conflict ratio equals 
Pc at the individual level. 
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a 
disaster affected 
disaster homeless 
disaster injured 
disaster deaths 
calories per capita 
religious majority 
ethnic majority 
vouth bulae 
Table 4-1. Variables Affecting the Probability 
of Conflict 
0.0032 0.0016 
0.0006 0.0021 
0.0027 0.001 8 
-0.0037 0.0014 
-0.1097 0.0821 
0.0474 0.0424 
-0.0691 0.0264 
0.1010 0.0461 
I Variable I Coefficient I Std. Error 
life expectancy 
open society 
libertv 
democracy 
0.1976 0.0799 
-0.0432 0.0171 
0.0036 0.0021 
0.0753 0.0384 
political rights 
constant 
prior conflict 
0.0135 0.0360 
0.0895 0.001 5 
- 1.0833 0.3220 
R2 
Durbin-Watson (DW) 
Note that the standard error on the coefficients is high. This is not a good regression, 
but the purpose here is more to evaluate methods than to provide usable quantifications. 
A positive sign for a coefficient indicates that a large value for the independent variable 
leads to a higher probability of conflict. Many of the qualitative results make good causal 
sense. 
0.740544 
316.4106 
A better standard of living (calories per capita) reduces the probability of conflict. A 
large number of restless, fighting-age youths provide ammunition to pursue conflicts. 
That prior conflict has a relatively large coefficient indicates that past information may be 
as relevant as current information. Survivors of disasters may need to take actions that 
lead to conflicts, such as the recent riots from hurricanes in Haiti. Deaths actually relieve 
the pressure on resources and could actually have the negative affect shown. The 
relatively large value of the constant term indicates that the use of only current-valued 
variables is too limiting, that there are many other important variables that have been 
omitted, or both. 
To avoid conhsion, we should emphasize the fact that civil liberties, political rights, 
and democracy indexes are defined in terms of rank. The civil liberties and political 
rights indexes are listed in decreasing rank order, ranging from “1” to “7”. That is, 
“1” denotes the most civil liberties, and “7” denotes the least civil liberties. Similarly, 
“I” denotes the most political rights, and “7” denotes the least political rights. The 
democracy index, on the other hand, is in increasing rank order ranging from -10 to 10, 
where “-10” denotes the least democratic and “10” denotes the most democratic. In this 
analysis, greater democracy is associated with a lower likelihood of conflict, as we would 
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expect, and has been proposed through the state-strength literature. However, higher civil 
liberties indexes (less freedom) correlate with a lower likelihood of conflict. The fact that 
civil liberties and political rights indexes seem to be positively correlated with conflict 
could imply that the conflicts may need to be disaggregated to include purpose. North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, allies of the United States, and the 
United States alone regularly engaged in “policing” conflicts. Only more advanced 
nations (presumably associated with greater civil liberty and political rights) would 
pursue policing functions. 
The regression indicates that the fewer the civil liberties, the less the probability of 
conflict. This result could be an artificial consequence of not separating the impact of 
civil liberties and other terms into regimes. A discussion in Section 3 shows a reversal of 
the impact of civil liberties when the analysis separates out regimes of ethnic and 
religious concentration. (See Table 3-9.) In a totalitarian society, strict control of the 
population limits the possibility of internal conflict. As civil liberties first become 
restricted, however, one would expect higher possibilities of resistance in the form of 
conflict. The focus of this effort is to determine the ability to recognize and delineate 
these issues, rather than the rigorous specification of the phenomena. 
The opposing signs on both ethnic and religious majorities might imply that they 
represent complex concepts with many interacting layers. At best, the results imply that 
neither variable can be used as an aggregate surrogate for more-specific societal 
conditions that are associated with ethnic or religious affiliations. Note that the analysis 
of Section 3 also encountered this situation. (See Table 3-10.) 
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The value of a QCT dynamic framework is illustrated in Figure 4-3, which shows the 
potential impact of climate change on conflict. An economy is initialized with a 50/50 
chance of conflict. With economic growth (assuming the calorie-per-capita coefficient as 
a surrogate for the impact of economic improvement), the probability of conflict declines 
as the economy grows (here assumed to be 3% per year). If climate change causes the 
incidence of destructive storms to double by 2030, there is only a slight increase in the 
probability of conflict. Three lines are shown to include the impact with the mean value 
of the estimated impact and to bound it within the standard error of parameter estimates 
(hillo). The “model assumptions,” however, only catch the temporary impact of 
disgruntled survivors and do not capture any economic impacts that could lead to large 
shortages, unemployment, and social unrest. If the climate change is also assumed to 
impact food production (in a dominantly agrarian society), the impact is much larger. 
. 
Figure 43.  Illustrative climate impacts on conflict. 
As shown in the top of Figure 4-3, in the mean-value case, the climate almost 
negates the impact of increased economic growth. In the worst case, the climate almost 
reverses the benefits of economic growth. With better data sets and a more 
comprehensive use of QCT, it is possible to accurately quantify the impact of climate 
events and mitigation efforts on conflict incidence and intensity. 
In summary, even at this cursory level, QCT shows itself as a valuable tool to 
understand conflict behavior. 
4.3 Cointegration and Granger Causality 
Cointegration was fmt conceived by Clive Granger (1981), but the development of 
the method was not achieved until 1987 (Engle 1987). Cointegration is now a widely 
accepted and used technique (Hamilton 1994; Engel 1991; Maddala 1992; Hendry 
1993,1995). It focuses on determining the dynatnics of no memory, short-term memory, 
and long-term memory within a data-generating process (DGP). The concept of “no 
memory” corresponds to a set of algebraic equations. Short- and long-term memories are 
naturally associated with state variables (integrated levels). Short-term memory 
conveniently corresponds to the reinforcing feedback dynamics and long-term memory to 
negative feedback dynamics, 
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4.3.1 Cointegration Mathematical Basics 
Cointegration discusses dynamics in terms of variables being jointly integrated (or 
differenced). To statisticians, the effort is to find stationarity in the residual error term. 
That is, they want the variables to stay related without the error term growing over time. 
4.3.1 .I Stationarity 
Differencing of a series with serial correlation will always result in stationarity if 
differenced enough times. An undifferenced equation is designated I(O), a first difference 
I( l), etc. 
A general introductory cointegrated equation would be 
A T  = BO + C B ,  * AX,,, + Bn * (q-l - F(X,, ,- ,))  + u, , (4.8) 
where A is the difference operator: AX = (X, -X,-,) ,  and ut is the error term. A problem 
with econometrics is that the time interval always coincides with the data collection 
interval. In the “delta t” limit, the difference equations are differential equations. The 
distinction between a “true” difference (discrete) equation and the “true” 
differentialhntegral equation will result in an anomalous A term that is “without physical 
interpretation” in the cointegrated equation. The F(X,, ,- ,)  is the asymptotic value of Y 
when Xis held constant. A nonzero BO distorts this definition and is often restricted to a 
0.0 value. The Bn * (K-l - F(X,, , - , ) )  term is called the error-correction mechanism 
(ECM). An example of F(X,, , - ] )  could be 
F ( X i , , - , ) = A O + A l * X 1 + A 2 * X 2 . .  . . (4-9) 
The use of a nonzero BO means that the A0 in Equation (4.9) becomes A0 = A0 + BO / Bn . 
As noted above, ut is the classical “error term.” Cointegration ensures that this term is 
never serially correlated. 
4.3.1.2 Unit Roots 
(4.10) is a simple autoregressive equation that highlights the cointegration logic. 
The determination of cointegration is based on the concept of a unit root. Equation 
r, = pq-, + E, (4.10) 
In Equation (4. lo), E is the error term but, unlike u in Equation (4.8), it might be serially 
correlated. I f p  is greater than unity, there is a positive feedback situation. If it is less than 
unity, there is a negative feedback situation. This makes sense by rewriting the equation 
to look a bit more like systems dynamics: 
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AY = dY = (p  -1) * Y = a Y .  (4.12) 
The sign of a determines the feedback-loop polarity. The polarity depends on the value 
of p compared to unity. If a is thought of as a positive growth rate, as in population 
growth, thenp is greater than 1 .O. The equation is not cointegrated. It only has short-term 
memory. The level changes slowly as other possible inputs affect it. A simple system- 
dynamics delay, as shown in Equation (4.13), with its long-term, cointegrating memory 
that parrots human-memory dynamics will clarify the unit-root significance (Sterman 
2000) 
Y, =ytp l  +dt*(S,  -q- , ) lT  
or 
Ar, =(S, - q J T ,  
where S is the input variable to be smoothed and Tis the averaging time. 
In general cointegration terms, 
A T  = BO + Bl * AS, + B2 * (S,-l - q-l). 
(4.13) 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
Equation (4.15) looks like the original cointegration equation (Equation [4.8]) above. By 
comparing Equations (4.1 1) and (4.13) to Equation (4.15), B l  and B2 have the definitions 
below. 
B2 = 1/T,  (4.16) 
B1= (p - 1). (4.17) 
The (p  - 1) term is comparable to its use in Equation (4.12) above. 
Note the minor issue of the time-subscript change on S between the difference 
equation (4.15) and the implied differential equation (4.1 1). This is not statistically 
significant, but it does change the causal interpretation of estimation results. 
The regression of Equation (4.15) corresponds to Equation (4.8) or (4.10) only i f p  is 
unity-the unit root. The unit root indicates the reinforcing loop limit. The value ofpjust 
needs to be unity from a statistical perspective. A value of less than unity will do as well 
in most cases. There is a problem i f p  is much above unity. The test thatp is statistically 
unity is then not the conventional t statistic for (p  - 1) being nonzero, but rather a 
modified distribution that is heavily skewed toward values below zero. The verification 
of the unit root is called the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, in cointegration jargon. 
A delay (memory) function is perfectly cointegrated. 
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A population-growth equation is not cointegrated. The serial correlation of the error 
term can be removed by simply assuming a growth rate. A growth-rate equation has the 
Bn of Equation (4.8) equal to 0.0 and the Bi not all equal to 0.0. 
4.3.2 Granger Causality Mathematical Basics 
The explicit use of lagged values determines “causality.” In cointegration, the test 
(Granger causality) is not to prove causality, but to verify when there is not causality. If 
Y, is a well-correlated function ofX&, the Xi could be causing 
correlated with a function ofX&+l (note the “+”), then the X, does not Granger-cause Y. 
Another perspective on Granger causality is to say that Y is explained better by order-n 
[l(n)] lags of X than by lags of Y alone. 
but if Yt is more 
The test of whether K is a function of X.,, occurs in the first pass of the two-stage 
cointegration regression process. The first stage estimates the long-term (asymptotic) 
solution, and the second stage estimates the dynamic AX contribution. Note that higher- 
order AY [I(n)] components can also be added to Equation (4.8). 
Granger causality seeks to falsify the X-causality by testing if all the &i are 0.0. This 
process requires comparison to the autocorrelation Equation (4.19) with the inclusive 
Equation (4.18): 
n I) 
P 
y, = c + c y i  + E , .  
i=l 
Let R l  be the sum of squared residuals for Equation (4.18), and let R2 be it for 
Equation (4.19): 
N 
R1 = Z P ?  9 
1 
N 
R2 = 
1 
If Nis the number of observations, the test is then 
N*(R2/R1-1) = ~ ’ ( p )  
(4.18) 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
(4.2 1) 
(4.22) 
Cointegration regularly verifies that assumptions about simultaneous 
relationshipshnteractions, such as the price being a function of current supply and 
demand (Hendry 2001,200 l), or that current weather drives current conflict, are not 
valid. Thus cointegration supports the agent-based-simulation view that interactions are 
caused by previous conditions or by long-term assets/perceptions associated with 
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previous conditions. The historical relevance, then, further implies that feedback must 
dominate the process. There must be state variables. Therefore, cointegration and agent- 
based modeling are integrally tied together. The implied existence of cointegration theory 
implies the existence of “memory.” If the process is balancing (negative feedback), the 
process must be cointegrated. 
DW 
2 
4.3.2.1 Testing Cointegration for Climate-Conflict Impacts 
Both cointegration and Granger causality were applied to the O’Brien data set to 
determine any relationship between disasters and conflict. The first test used a lag across 
five time periods. As shown in Table 4-2, the test produces possibly acceptable statistical 
results, but from a cointegration perspective it fails. The x2 (chi-square) indicates there is 
approximately a 70% chance that disasters have no impact on conflict, that is, a 70% 
chance there is no causality. 
505.656 
0.686 
Table 4-2. Five-Lag Granger 
Causality Test 
Granger causality is very sensitive to the choice of lag length. A hypothesis could 
state that farmers can handle a year or so of bad weather, but then the accumulation of 
financial damage or the dwindling of food reserves sets up the impact of the final 
“tipping point” disaster. Table 4-3 used a single five-year lag. It implies the hypothesis is 
valid and indicates that historical disasters have only a 0.3% chance of not affecting 
conflict. 
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Table 4-3. Single-Lag Granger 
Test 
I Variable 1 coefficient 1 
Constant 0.541 153 
0.530242 
465.047 
0.0033 
Lastly, the cursory cointegration test also indicates that conflict does indeed reflect a 
unit-root process (p  = 1). Therefore, the mechanism describing conflict should be robust 
over a wide range of future and unforeseen conditions. A simulation including those 
discovered mechanisms, thereby, supports a simulation platform whose results have a 
high degree of confidence. 
Cointegration produces incredibly accurate forecasts in timing and magnitude. The 
equations are often found by using all the information available and include higher-order 
differencing (all the combinations). This is called a-theoretical modeling. Some 
parameters can be construed to have an economic interpretation. Those that have none are 
still deemed legitimate by analysts because they add to the accuracy of the forecast and 
intervention impacts. It appears that cointegration can help with system definition and its 
verification. Cointegration does help determine the implied equilibrium goal of societal 
systems. It can determine whether positive or negative feedback mechanisms are missing. 
Cointegration tends to show that historical data do not have structural breaks. Humans 
make decisions as they always have, despite wars and stock-market bubbles. 
Cointegration indicates that the model equations should produce the "break" response 
from the changing input data (or endogenous model dynamics) and not from the changing 
model structure. These qualities would appear very useful for addressing the impact of 
climate change on conflict or for ensuring that agent-based models produce valid results. 
4.4 Bayesian Causal Discovery 
BCD (Bayesian causal discovery) is a final complementary method to both QCT and 
cointegration. BCD is relatively new and remains controversial (Kim 1997). The 
development of the technique depended in part on the greater computational capabilities 
available today for solving nondeterministic polynomial (NPkhard problems via 
exhaustive search. The original (Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [SGS] algorithm) 
approach was developed by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines (1993). It goes beyond 
Granger casualty to actually claim knowledge of the causal relationship within a specified 
degree of confidence (Pearl 1998; Salmon 2001). 
In general, BCD assumes only nonexperimental data-the only data generally 
available in socioeconomic modeling. It combines several concepts and assumptions that 
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may, at first, sound overly restrictive, but they are actual broadly applicable to most real- 
world situations. 
4.4.1 BCD Mathematical Basics 
The basic concept of BCD is based on the assumptions that actual causal 
relationships exist and that the data available are usable to support a position on the 
confidence in a causal assertion. All potential causal relationships (even those that will 
later prove to be independent) are collected. These are assembled into all possible 
directed acyclic graphs (DAGs). “Acyclic” indicates that no feedback loops are modeled. 
This does not mean that there are no feedback loops. It means that a feedback loop 
contains a state variable (an integrated level). The time-subscript change occurring at the 
level allows an unfolding of the loop for statistical analysis purposes, such that the t - 1 is 
at one end of the DAG and the t term is at the other end of the DAG. (Note again that this 
logic validates the approach associated with agent-based simulation). 
If we hypothesize that X causes Y and that Y causes 2, the DAG would simply be as 
shown in Figure 4-4. 
Figure 44 .  Simple DAG. 
Just like a flow diagram, the arrow direction indicates (assumed) causality. The causality 
can be designated apriori with a positive or negative as a restriction to the statistical 
analysis of the data that determines the correlations and rejects many DAGs. 
There are generally many variables and thus many potential combinations with 
multiple connections, such as shown in Figure 4-5. 
A - B - C y X  
J 
y’/ 1 
J 
Figure 4-5. Multipath DAG. 
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The SGS algorithm would look at all possible combinations of connections of the 
variables in Figure 4-5 as a possible cause of any other variables. The SGS algorithm 
looks for “d-separation” points in the DAGs it generates. In the case of L in Figure 4.5, 
conditional on V, 2, and X above, only G and H affect L. In Figure 4-4, Y d-separates X 
and 2. Given X, 2 only depends causally on Y. 
The d-separated sets in any DAG are then tested to determine the correlation (or lack 
thereof) among the variables in a given direction of causality. If two variables are not d- 
separated, they are conditionally dependent. All the conditionally dependent variables (d- 
connected) affecting another variable in a DAG constitute the potential casual 
relationship with that variable. 
In any BCD analysis, the data must be “faithful” to any causal assertion. The “causal 
faithfulness” is a key concept in that it not only implies that the representation is valid, 
but that there is acceptable confidence (faith) that the relationship is truly causal. All the 
relationships are represented as Bayesian networks where the data are used to determine 
the conditional probability of one variable, given its d-connected variables and 
conditional on the values affecting the d-separated variables (Howson 1993). The 
independence of a variable is provided by the causal Markov condition. To have a causal 
Markov condition, a variable Xmust be independent of (not causally related to) every 
other variable, conditional on all of its direct causes. That is, the variable Xmust be 
causally faithful. Causal Markov conditions are the basis for the assumed causality found 
via the statistical search (Suppes 1990). 
In any BCD analysis, those DAGs that cannot be causal due to time-lag 
considerations (Y,+I can never cause Zt), are thrown out. Any apriori considerations that 
exclude some combinations are also used to reduce the possibilities that must be tested. 
Equation (4.23) illustrates the more general logic. Other prior considerations (K)  are 
added as appropriate (or justified) and combined with the data (0) to produce the 
posterior probability that, for example, Y causes 2 given observations 0 and prior 
knowledge K. Let S be the set of all possible combinations of DAG available related to Y 
causes 2. The probability that Y causes 2 conditional on 0 and K is then 
P(Y -+ 2 I 0, K )  = CP(S ,  0) I K )  . 
S { Y+ Z }  element of S 
(4.23) 
Glymour provides the details of the process (Glymour 1999). Additional statistics 
quantify the probability that the probability of causality is meaningful. These 
probabilities can be ranked. Usually, only one DAG stands out as most probable. 
Remember that, by definition, all causal possibilities are present; so the result is 
definitionally determining “THE Causality.” It is possible that there will be a small group 
of causal inferences with statistically comparable probabilities. Frequently, this means 
that all are part of a more elaborate single causal process that includes latent 
(unmeasured) variables not known or not available in the data. To an econometrician, this 
phenomena is called encompassing. It is implied that the latent variable has interactions 
, 
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with all the “competing causality” DAGS. The inclusion of a meaningful latent variable 
can also be used to tie the set together for statistical parameterization of the equations. 
Sometimes the data are simply not available to determine the causality. This is truer 
for aggregate country data than, for example, industry data. A latent variable that 
represents a critical level tightly tied in feedback violates all the premises required for 
causal discovery. Luckily, such a hidden level is uncommon. The technique only avoids 
controversy when it is used for verification of assumed causality or to sort through 
competing causal hypotheses during model construction. 
Causal discovery techniques can add credibility to contentious causal assumptions. 
These techniques can sort through contradictory casual assumptions. They can find 
(potential) causal relationships when the set of relationships used in the model seems 
inconsistent with historical data. Conversely, these techniques can show where there is 
variable independence despite claims by “reviewers” of cooperative or coordinated 
activities. The use of causal discovery is then to “prove” that there is not causality. In this 
situation, only the DAG assumed by the reviewer is needed to show the lack of 
correlation, i.e., the lack of a causal Markov condition. 
4.5 Summary 
This work suggests that cointegration, Granger causality, QCT (qualitative choice 
theory), and BCD (Bayesian causal discovery) can be useful to the analysis of climate 
change. Further, even cursory results will help guide the direction of future work. For 
example, the buildup of societal pressures from previous disasters is key to understanding 
how disasters affect conflict. The apparent unit-root nature of the process indicates the 
simulation will be robust and valid. Even with extremely limited data, QCT provides 
insights and gives confidence in its use to simulate human behavior. 
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5 Agent and Climate Model Coupling 
In this section, we discuss how to couple an agent-based social model with a physics- 
based climate model. The discussion begins with an overview of the climate model. 
Then, we define the steps necessary to fully couple the two models. 
5.1 The Community Climate System Model 
For the climate model, we focus on the Community Climate System Model (CCSM), 
the United States’ largest research effort (CCSM 2004). The CCSM is a fully-coupled, 
global climate model that provides state-of-the-art computer simulations of the Earth’s 
past, present, and future climate states. It is a large ($9 million per year) interagency 
collaboration that is funded by the National Science Foundation, the Department of 
Energy, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration. The CCSM is headquartered at the National Center for 
Atmospheric Research, but major components are developed at other organizations such 
as Oak Ridge and Los Alamos National Laboratories. The CCSM has over 100 active 
participants with expertise in a wide range of disciplines. 
The CCSM is used for studying the Earth’s climate and the climate’s sensitivities to 
a range of natural and man-made changes to our environment. The CCSM has four main 
components: an atmospheric model, an ocean model, a land surface model and a sea ice 
model. The individual models do not talk directly to each other, but instead communicate 
via a separate software component known as the flux coupler. The CCSM is freely 
available to any interested researcher. The model components are all designed to run 
reasonably well on both cache-based and vector processors and make use of industry- 
standard parallel-programming environments to run on distributed-memory systems. The 
CCSM is quite portable and runs on a wide variety of supercomputer platforms. It 
includes built-in test facilities suitable for validating installation and verifying some types 
of model changes. 
To document and validate the CCSM, various multicentury control runs are 
carried out. All output data from these control runs are available to the public. The Earth 
System Grid (ESG) is the primary method for distributing these output data (ESG 2004). 
Another series of CCSM experiments is under way that will provide data for an 
upcoming Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Report. The 
IPCC study will result in 100-year data sets for a variety of future scenarios, mostly 
related to different levels of increase in atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) 
concentrations. Data from these experiments will be made available in late 2004. The 
data take the form of monthly means for a vast array of quantities predicted and 
diagnosed by the model. Examples include monthly mean temperatures and precipitation, 
vegetation growth, and soil conditions. The data are stored using the NetCDF format, and 
are easily accessible via software libraries for FORTRAN, C, and C++. 
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5.2 Development of a Coupled Model 
The ultimate goal in an agent-based coupled CCSM model would be full two-way 
coupling, where the agents can respond to the wide range of climate data produced by the 
CCSM and the CCSM can respond to the effects predicted by the agent model. For 
example, consider desertification brought on by a long-lasting drought. The initial 
desertification may trigger political upheaval resulting in major changes to farming and 
other land use. These changes could greatly accelerate desertification as compared to 
what would have occurred naturally, and this accelerated desertification cannot be 
predicted by a model that did not take into account human reactions to climate change. 
There is a logical progression of steps towards the full two-way coupling of agent- 
based social models with the CCSM. We first assume that a robust agent-based social 
model has been developed that can be used to study the sensitivity of social, political, and 
economic situations to climate change. Such a model would rely on climate data for some 
of its input. For example, a model of Darfur would require knowledge of the rate of 
desertification predicted by the CCSM’s land surface model. The first step towards two- 
way coupling is one-way coupling, where the agent model reacts to the climate data 
produced by the CCSM but without affecting the CCSM. Such a one-way coupling can 
easily be implemented in an “off-line” fashion, where the agent model simply uses 
precomputed CCSM data sets as input for its climate data. Because of the tremendous 
amount of CCSM data available for a wide range of future climate scenarios, we believe 
one-way off-line coupling will be adequate for the vast majority of problems. 
Using an off-line coupling approach means that the agent model can only access the 
data that the CCSM model archived while it was being run. It is possible that the type of 
data archived is not sufficient for some agent models. For example, studies may show 
that important effects are sensitive to daily fluctuations in certain quantities as 
opposed to the monthly means available in the CCSM data sets. In this case, one would 
have to implement an “on-line” coupling model in which the agents are incorporated 
directly into the CCSM model. Implementing on-line coupling requires some additional 
software engineering, but this task is made straightforward by the CCSM design. While 
the CCSM model is being run on a parallel computer, any component (including a 
possible agent-based component) can request the precise data it needs from the flux 
coupler, using the flux coupler’s well-documented interfaces. 
Once the development of an on-line one-way coupled model is complete, the final 
step of extending this to a two-way coupled model is straightforward. For example, any 
human activity predicted by the agent-based model that results in changes in CO2 
production can be incorporated back into the CCSM via the flux coupler. 
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6 Using Wiki in a Collaborative Environment 
To facilitate communication across our climate project team, we created a Wiki site 
on Sandia’s internal Web. According to the developer of Wiki, Ward Cunningham, Wiki 
is “the simplest online database that could possibly work” (Cunningham and Leuf 2002). 
More specifically, Wiki is a component of server software that allows users to create and 
edit the content of Web pages using any Web browser. In this section, we describe the 
general features of the Wiki platform that we used, our reasons for choosing the Wiki 
mode of interactive communication, and impressions of team members regarding the 
value of the Wiki platform. 
f 
6.1 General Platform Features 
We created a Wiki site for the climate project by making use of TWiki, a Web-based 
collaborative platform that is used by many companies for project development and 
planning activities as well as for document management (Matias 2003). TWiki is open- 
source software that can be downloaded free (Thoeny 2004). Our Wiki is available to 
members of our project team, as well as to users of Sandia’s internal Web, a restricted 
network. All users on Sandia’s internal Web can access our Wiki through a Web address 
and can view information on the site. However, to change information on the site, users 
are required to have their own user names and associated passwords on this system. Thus, 
access to Sandia’s internal Web, also an authenticated system, provides limited access 
into our Wiki. Members of our climate project have full access to the platform features, 
once registered. 
As shown in the inset on 
the right, a Web site on Wiki 
has a similar feel to a Web site 
on the Internet. For example, 
Web pages are written in 
HyperText Markup Language 
(HTML); however, TWiki 
offers some very powerful 
additional features. There is no 
Webmaster. Using HTML, any 
page on the Web site and edit 
any content on any page of the 
can upload and download any 
file as an attachment to any 
Web page. The inset shows a 
portion of a page that one of 
our team members created. This page contains links to other Web site pages, as shown in 
the colored hypertext entries. We used this page as an index to the site. Our site also had 
. ~ h . v l * T Y n h n E & g + l a ~ ~  Ld,..fnnnntGQ 
registered user can create a . h f - d h  sct do-dppn .  budby 
m , h a o f h ” h  C m I ( * d J ~ p i * b , & m - d t m ?  
Web site. Any registered user . Cmdm.MC~r~4Jqrur.ol...,.nh~d~~SudqD.mra 
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a blog, where we could comment on what we were doing at the time and communicate 
with everyone about our work. 
6.2 Why We Chose to Use a Wiki 
Our climate project is composed of members who come from several different 
disciplines and who are physically located in different places, i.e., different buildings at 
Sandia, offsite from Sandia, and different states as well. The project also had a very short 
time frame, which pointed to the need for some type of centralized medium through 
which all would be connected. 
The features of the Wiki supported our needs by allowing all team members to be 
informed about the work in progress at the same time. Members can access documents, 
change them, and post them (as edited) back to the Wiki at any time. Thus, two or more 
people working on different topics can make changes to the same document at the same 
time. In the more traditional communications environment, documents in review are sent 
to individuals one at a time. Any changes a reviewer makes are generally not known to 
other members of the team except, perhaps, to the person responsible for updating the 
document and anyone else the reviewer chooses to send those updates to. 
6.3 User Impressions of the Wiki 
The time frame of this project was only a few months, so it is too early to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the Wiki in facilitating communications for our team. Implementing 
the Wiki was an experiment, and we expected that this type of media may take a longer 
period for users to get familiar with its capabilities. Nonetheless, we wanted to get a pulse 
on the prospect of continuing to use the Wiki in the next phase of the climate project and 
thus queried team members about their impressions of using the platform. 
In general, responses to using the Wiki were quite favorable, though most of the 
team members took advantage of only a few of the features. Several members 
commented on the value of having documents that are in review accessible to everyone, 
whether they are posted in HTML on the Web pages or downloadable from the Web 
pages as attached files. Another team member commented, “It’s like a virtual library of 
our project. I can see what everyone else is doing, which saves all of us time because I 
don’t have to call or email them to find out what is going on.” Several members said that 
the downloading feature was better than email because you didn’t have to wonder if you 
were getting the latest version of a document. 
As with any new technology, there was a bit of resistance in getting started. And for 
some there was a learning curve to take advantage of certain features such as creating and 
editing Web pages. These actions could require writing in HTML, and not everyone had 
done this before. The Wiki offers a tutorial on how to generate HTML using simplified 
formatting symbols, and several team members used that tutorial to get started. 
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According to the principal investigator on the climate project, there is a certain point 
where usage of new forms of media is optimal. Given the responses to the user 
impressions about the Wiki, as well as observations on the site, our team is not quite at 
that point. However, team members indicated that with more time available, they would 
likely use the Wiki more often and try out more of its features. Regarding the use of the 
Wiki for the next phase of the project, one member ventured that the platform could serve 
the team very well as a central repository for source code and from which to run the new 
models during the development period. 
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7 Summary of Findings and Lessons Learned 
This section summarizes the key findings from the various activities in which we 
engaged during the initial phase of the climate project. 
Darfur Candidate Case Study. Monitoring the current events and reviewing the 
historical literature about the Darfur conflict provided rich insight into the complex and 
interrelated factors and conditions that can lead to war. The exercise in developing a 
concept map prompted us to identify the interlocking systemic elements of the conflict 
and to carefully consider how and in what ways each element can influence and be 
influenced by other elements. 
Causal Factors of Conflict Study. Conducting the quantitative analyses to explore the 
causal factors related to the study of state conflict helped us in a number of ways. First, 
we identified and summarized representative data that are used in various conflict 
models, including the COW database and the KOSIMO database. Second, we found 
through traditional statistical analyses of the data that traditional methods are useful but 
limited for understanding how to model the effects of macrostructural changes, such as 
wealth, food, income, and social diversity, on conflict. Traditional methods cannot 
extrapolate into extreme situations that have occurred in history. Most of the work 
performed to understand the effects of macrostructural changes on conflict has been 
empirical, by which we mean that the predictive nature of the analyses is based on 
identifying patterns in the historical data. Third, we note that traditional statistical 
methods have inherent limitations, such as measurement error, latent variables, and an 
inability to model many complex interrelationships. 
In our causal factors study, we also found that there are significant relationships 
between various conditions of a region and its likelihood to engage in conflict. With 
regard to climate change, we found that food consumption and casualties from natural 
disasters can affect conflict. For example, climate change could decrease crop yields or 
increase the likelihood of disasters like flooding and tidal waves, and thereby increase the 
instability and likelihood of conflict. 
Other Statistical Methods Study. Our review and analysis of other models include the 
use of three relatively recent entrants to knowledge analysis for the behavioral and social 
sciences: QCT (qualitative choice theory), Granger causality, BCD (Bayesian causal 
discovery), and cointegration. Preliminary assessment of these methods revealed the 
following: 
(1) Rudimentary cointegration analysis indicates there does appear to be resilient 
mechanisms that remain functional during conflict. The simulation of these 
mechanisms can provide robust indicators of conflict dynamics. 
immediate events dominate the incidence of conflict. Absent external pressures, 
internal pressures appear to act to restore conditions to a status quo situation. 
(2) Cursory analysis indicates that accumulating circumstances rather than 
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(3) QCT does seem able to robustly capture the human (behavioral) process of 
assimilating information (internal and external circumstances and pressures) that 
leads to a decision to enter into conflict. QCT robustly simulates both rational 
and irrational behaviors. 
verified by BCD. The determination of causality remains an open issue in 
conflict analysis that BCD might be able to address. 
(4) The cointegration and QCT work further indicates a causality that could be 
The use of the preliminary data indicates that environmental change could easily 
reverse the progress made to-date in stabilizing economies (nations) and, with a lower 
probability, send the economies into a condition where the probability of conflict 
increases significantly. 
Development of Coupling Process for Climate and Agent-Based Models. We found 
that coupling an agent-based model with the U.S. flagship climate model, the CCSM, 
requires only straightforward software engineering due to the design of the CCSM. This 
coupling can be done in a series of small steps leading to the development of a fully 
coupled agent/climate model. Each step can be tested and verified before moving to the 
next step. 
Wiki Platform Usage. As expected, we found that introducing a new form of media 
requires a sufficient time period in which users can get comfortable and experiment with 
the new technology. Encouraging members to communicate their work progress through 
the Wiki does have a payoff, as the Web we created contains contributions by all team 
members. 
I 
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8 Future Plans and Applications 
In this section, we briefly outline our approach to developing a coupled 
climate/agent-based model and possible applications for its use in related and different 
fields. 
8.1 Ongoing Project Development 
For the next phase of this LDRD project, computational modeling offers a promising 
means to develop and test hypotheses about linkages between environmental change and 
its impact on critical resources and potential subsequent impact on preventing or 
contributing to conflict. Our multidisciplinary team will develop a suite of computational 
tools to understand the emergence of unforeseen system thresholds (i.e., “tipping points”) 
caused by environmental stresses, especially those associated with abrupt or gradual 
climate change. 
We will initially focus on developing a set of simple agent-based models that will 
take advantage of the work and the results we observed during the initial project start-up 
period, as documented in this white paper. We will develop actual, not candidate, case 
studies from the literature, focusing on the loss of arable land due to desertification or 
rising sea levels, leading to migration and population pressure. Darfur is one area where 
such processes have well-documented impacts. Other possible areas for review include 
Egypt, Bangladesh, and China. 
Agent behaviors will be further improved by running genetic algorithms on Sandia’s 
high-performance computers. These algorithms allow us to automatically explore a vast 
range of potential agent rules using a survival-of-the-fittest methodology to find rules that 
best identify the key feedbacks that lead to conflict and stability. This will provide insight 
into local responses leading to emergent phenomena associated with conflict and stability 
and to seek mitigation strategies for highly idealized cases. We will also incorporate 
CCSM (Community Climate System Model) climate data, including 100-year simulations 
using various CO2 scenarios that are being run for the upcoming IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report. Data for this report will be available in late 2004. The highest 
resolution available will be approximately 150 kilometers, which will be sufficient to 
determine at a regional level (including substate or transboundary) how changes in 
rainfall, temperature, and growing season might impact communities and lead to conflict. 
We also hope to add formal uncertainty quantification and validation components to 
the initial activities described above. A mixed climate/agent simulation tool poses 
significant problems for verification and validation (V&V), which we consider to be 
essential elements in any decision process that might incorporate the results of this type 
of simulation. Verification centers on the accumulation of evidence that the feedbacks in 
our overall model are correctly implemented and provide mathematically accurate 
answers. Validation is the somewhat more difficult question of whether the associated 
simulations (or the conceptual models embedded in them) are correct representations of 
the required phenomena. 
Subsequent development will involve combining and migrating the simple agent 
models to a more complex cellular model in which agents act within cells representing 
multiple regions. These boundaries will be generated from case studies and may include 
political, ecological, economic, or culturally defined borders. Agents may attempt to 
move from one cell to another, based upon factors associated with competition over 
resources. Climate changes will be introduced as impacting the availability and 
accessibilty of local resources. The model will incorporate representations of key 
variables related to conflict. 
We will also develop a software capability of coupling the CCSM to our agent model 
to allow the bidirectional feedbacks necessary to model desertification caused by land- 
use responses. Model parameters will be varied to generate hypotheses about climate- 
change-induced loss of arable land. Of importance is the capability to change time scales, 
so we can explore how responses vary under conditions of gradual versus more rapid 
climate change. We will apply the V&V path forward, identified above, to our 
application of the CCSM and will begin to develop validation procedures for the agent- 
based models used in the project. Our ultimate goal is to have a useful agent model and 
the capability of coupling it to the CCSM. We intend to be running coupled CCSM/agent 
simulations at 150-kilometer resolution, allowing us to model the feedback loop between 
the agents and physical climate systems. 
8.2 Applications 
High-performance computing, coupled with a convergence of capabilities at Sandia, 
puts this area of research in position for rapid advancement. The results of our ongoing 
work should be useful in multiple program areas at Sandia, including intelligence 
analysis and systems approaches to environmental problems. This work supports 
Sandia’s mission to develop technical solutions for complex problems that threaten 
national security. Currently, analysis of responses to climate change consists of expert 
judgment and narrative analysis. We expect that coupling agent behaviors to physical 
processes represents a technical innovation in computational modeling and will lay the 
groundwork for the development of interdisciplinary technologies capable of analyzing 
ecological and critical-resource problems. 
79 
Distribution 
External Distribution 
1 Sean P. O’Brien 
Center for Army Analysis 
6001 Goethals Road 
Ft. Belvoir, VA 22060-5230 
1 Richard Colbaugh 
Department of Management 
New Mexico Institute of Mining 
and Technology 
Socorro, NM 87801 
1 
1 
Karen Walker 
Science and Technology 
Directorate 
U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 
Washington, DC 20520 
Kristin Glass 
National Center for Genome 
Resources 
2935 Rodeo Park Drive East 
Santa Fe, NM 87505 
Sandia Internal Distribution 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
5 
20 
20 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
0161 
0619 
0899 
9018 
0321 
1110 
0318 
0318 
0318 
0196 
1109 
032 1 
0749 
0839 
0196 
Patent & Licensing Office 
Review & Approval Desk 
Technical Library 
Central Technical Files 
W. J. Camp 
D. E. Womble 
J. E. Nelson 
S. G. Wagner 
M. B. E. Boslough 
J. A. Sprigg 
R. J. Pryor 
R. W. Leland 
L. A. Malczynski 
L. A. McNamara 
G. A. Backus 
CAA 
NSA 
DHS 
NCGR 
11500 
092 16 for DOE/OSTI 
096 16 
09200 
092 10 
092 16 
09209 
092 16 
092 16 
092 16 
09220 
060 10 
06924 
092 16 
08945-1 
I 
, 
80 
1 0318 
1 0318 
1 0196 
1 0318 
1 0316 
1 0316 
1 0839 
1 0839 
1 0839 
1 0123 
1 1221 
1 0703 
1 0839 
1 0735 
1 0370 
1 1138 
1 1206 
1 0839 
1 0839 
1 0839 
1 1138 
1 0776 
1 0735 
1 0735 
1 0735 
1 0741 
1 0701 
1 1375 
1 0711 
1 1219 
1 0720 
1 0720 
1 0720 
1 0703 
1 1363 
1 1373 
1 1373 
1 1374 
1 1371 
1 1379 
1 1377 
1 0779 
1 1373 
R. K. Reinert 
C. R. Jorgensen 
M. D. Peters 
M. A. Taylor 
S. S. Dosanjh 
W. F. Spotz 
G. Yonas 
T. H. Karas 
C. M. Johnson 
H. R. Westrich 
R. L. Rigby 
W. B. Cox 
P. S. Gingrich 
K. M. Murphy 
T. G. Trucano 
A. J. Scholand 
M. J. Can- 
W. B. Jones 
N. K. Hayden 
J. H. Moore 
M. A. Ehlen 
J. S. Stein 
T. S. Lowry 
H. D. Passel1 
R. E. Finley 
M. L. Tatro 
P. B. Davies 
D. E. Ellis 
C. Shaw 
T. P. Wright 
R. C. Pate 
A. A. M. Hasan 
P. 1. Pohl 
M. P. Ross 
M. T. Olascoaga 
K. L. Biringer 
A. L. Pregenzer 
J. H. Saloio Jr. 
R. M. Huelskamp 
W. G. Rhodes I11 
M. J. McDonald 
A. H. Mohagheghi 
H-N. JOW 
092 16 
092 16 
09216 
092 16 
09233 
09233 
16000 
16000 
16000 
0101 1 
15130 
062 18 
16000 
16001 
0921 1 
0622 1 
05932 
16000 
05925 
16000 
0622 1 
06852 
061 15 
061 15 
061 15 
06200 
06100 
06900 
06 100 
05923 
061 15 
06143 
06 143 
062 18 
06920 
06924 
06920 
06927 
06926 
06952 
06956 
06874 
06924 
81 
